The concept of *impulsive-intentionality* (Triebintentionalität) as something not-coming-out from the egological source, has great importance in Husserlian phenomenology. Since it does not properly belong to the egological field, such intentionality could appear to disagree with Husserl’s phenomenological strictness, whereas it seems to manifest its own autonomy (in the *hyletical* sphere) with respect to the transcendental sphere.

In reality, as we will see later, the *impulsive-intentionality* exhibits rather a substantial productivity, even in the phenomenological Effectiveness field, wherein according to the metaphysical intuition, ‘insight’ (Einsicht) as Husserl defines it, it is possible to reach a primordial Evidence in his pre-logical dimension (vortheoretisch1).

In *Manuscript E III 5*, Husserl talks about the *impulsive-intentionality* in relation to an impulse, which moves everyone from inside. “Ich habe,” writes Husserl, “nicht sie als ichliche (in weitesten Sinn Willensintentionalität) charakterisiert” but “als einer ichlosen (‘Passivität’) fundierte eingeführt”.2 Thus Husserl defines this intentionality as pre-direct (aufgewiesene), non-volitive, and essentially without-Ego.3

Here we would like to consider some questions concerning the *impulsive-intentionality*. The first problem is to evaluate if this intentionality could be considered as a *primum* or merely as a material aspect which develops through the Ego without being its product (the difference between the *volitive-intentionality* and the *impulsive-intentionality*): “ob nicht und notwendig Triebintentionalität ... eine Vorstufe hat, die vor einer ausgebildeten Weltkonstitution liegt”.4

The second question we would like to address has a bipolar nature: on one side, “wie die Ichzentirung zu verstehen ist, in der Universalität der intentionalen Implikation in der ständig konstituierten all-primordialen ursümpischen lebendigen Gegenwart ...”5 and on the other, to try to define the *telos* that emerges in the reality and that manifests itself ‘concretely’ in history, under the form of an ‘impulsive intentionality’.

To summarize, the focus of this work is to verify whether and how the hyletic productivity and the transcendental activity flow together in the same teleological creativity and, consequently, if the “living entelechy”
could be a possible bridge between the hylētic \textit{impulsive-intentionality} and the \textit{ego-logical-volitive intentionality}. The objective becomes then to try and track a form of “original evidence” in the passivity, by examining its pre-logical aspect. As Husserl says, “die reine Hule ist jergendwie Ichlos”.\textsuperscript{6}

1. THE \textit{HYLETICAL AUTONOMY}

First we would like to explain the phenomenological meaning of some words. For example ‘Stuff’ (\textit{Stoff}) may be envisaged as \textit{irrational material}. That is the \textit{primal hyle (Ur-hyle)}, i.e. the \textit{completely undifferentiated material}, which \textit{adheres in all development hyle}. The definition of reality is then founded on two concepts: \textit{real (real)} and really (\textit{reel}). Real, explains Piana, “is used as opposed to \textit{ideal} and means the empirical reality, ‘outside’. \textit{Reel} is all that really is given in the lived-experience (\textit{Erlebnis})”.\textsuperscript{7} We can thus simplify: ‘real’ is the Effectiveness in the actuality of the real existent (\textit{Wirklichkeit}); ‘reel’ is the experienced \textit{datum (Realität)}.

Concerning the perceptive element of the lived-experience, Husserl differentiates two important moments: an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ moment.\textsuperscript{8} In the first moment the indirect and reflective experience is added to the direct and immediate object of the experience (‘outside’ moment). In this perception the object appears globally characterized as a Unity (\textit{Einheit}), but it has some \textit{concreteness}: it is not given “in one’s own person” (\textit{leibhaftig}). On the contrary, in direct perception we have ‘in front of us’ the real object, even though we can say that this object isn’t \textit{really complete}. Or better: the object isn’t \textit{merely} only the one we are able to see.

In this sense, our Effective seeing reveals some limits relative to the really \textit{factum- ‘sight’}, in its fullness. Husserl explains: “Wir sehen, so heißt das, ein Haus, aber eigentlich sehen wir nur die Vorderseite”.\textsuperscript{9} Thus we have properly (\textit{eigentlich}) only a partial perception of the think-House. “Das Ding hat im Sinne der Wahrnehmung mehr als im prägnanten Sinn perzierte oder erscheinende Vorderseite; und dieses ‘mehr’ entbehrt ihm speziell zugehöriger darstellender Inhalte. Es ist in der Wahrnehmung in gewisser Weise mitgenommen, aber ohne selbs zu Darstellung zu kommen”.\textsuperscript{10}