The life-world, as Husserl holds, is a realm of original self-evidences [Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology; Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 127]. In Husserl's description, that which is self-evidently given, is in perception, experienced as "the thing itself", in immediate presence, or in memory, remembered as the thing itself and every other manner of intuition is a prescientification of the thing itself, every mediate cognition belonging in this sphere has the sense of an induction of something intuitable [Ibid., 128]. All conceivable verification, leads back to these modes of self-evidence because the "thing itself" lies in these intuitions themselves as that which is actually intersubjectively experienceable and verifiable and is not a substructure of thought; whereas such a substructure, insofar as it makes a claim to truth, can have actual truth only by being related back to such self-evidence.

To Husserl, it is itself a highly important task for the scientific opening-up of the life-world, to recognize the primal validity of these self-evidences and indeed their higher dignity in the grounding of knowledge compared to that of the objective-logical self-evidences.

In geometrical and natural-scientific mathematization, in the open infinity experiences, "we measure the life-world for a well-fitting grab of ideas, that of so-called objectively scientific truths" [Ibid., 51]. According to Husserl, the belief that the natural sciences are based on the experience of objective nature, is true only in that sense whereby experience yields a self-evidence taking place purely in the life-world and as such is the source of self-evidence for what is objectively established in the sciences, the latter never themselves bringing experiences of the objective. Indeed, the objective, as Husserl holds, is never precisely experienceable as itself, and scientists themselves consider it in this way whenever they interpret it as something metaphysically transcendent. From this point of view, naturally "rendering ideas intuition" in the manner of mathematical or natural-scientific "models" is hardly intuition of the objective itself; but rather a matter of life-world intuitions which are suited to ease the conception of the objective ideals in question. Husserl points out that many conceptual intermediaries are often involved, especially since the
conception itself does not always occur immediately, and cannot always be made so self-evident in its way, as is the case in conceiving of geometrical straight lines on the basis of the life-world self-evidence of straight table-edges and the like [Ibid., 129].

The bodies familiar to us in the life-world are actual bodies, but not bodies in the sense of physics. On the basis of Husserl’s sense, the same thing is true of causality and of spatiotemporal infinity. These categorical features of the life-world have the same names but are not concerned with the theoretical idealization and hypothetical substructures of the geometer and physicist. As Husserl maintains, “just as other projects, practical interests, and their realizations belong to the life-world presuppose it as ground, and enrich it with science, too as a human project and praxis. And this includes, everything objectively a priori, with its necessary reference back to a corresponding a priori of the life-world. This reference-back is one of a founding of validity” [Ibid., 140].

To Husserl, prescientifically, the world is already a spatiotemporal world; in regard to this spatiotemporality, there is no question of ideal mathematical points of “pure” straight lines or planes, no question at all of mathematically infinitesimal continuity or of the “exactness” belonging to the sense of the geometrical a priori.

The life-world “for us who walkingly live in it, is always already there, existing in advance for us, the ‘ground’ of all praxis whether theoretical or extratheoretical” [Ibid., 142]. The point that should be made here is, according to Husserl, the world does not exist as an entity, as an object, but it exists with such uniqueness that the plural make no sense when applied to it [Ibid].

In Husserl’s view, there is a fundamental difference between the way we are conscious of the world and the way we are conscious of things or objects (though together the two make up an inseparable unity), which prescribes fundamentally different correlative types of consciousness for them. Husserl believes that things are given as being valid for us in each case but in principle only in such a way that we are conscious of them as things within the world-horizon (a horizon of possible thing-experience); “each one is something, ‘something of’ the world of which we are constantly conscious as a horizon, on the other hand, we are conscious of this horizon only as a horizon for existing objects; without objects of consciousness it cannot be actual” [Ibid., 143]. Every plural, and every singular drawn from it, presupposes the world-horizon. All natural questions, all theoretical and practical goals taken as themes have to do with something or other within the world-horizon. As Husserl says, “this is