Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged from a four-year war as a destroyed and a poor country. The war damage is estimated to amount to over 200 billion US dollars.¹ No segment of society has been left untouched by war. Reconstruction thus had to encompass not only material goods but also all aspects of the functioning of a state. Due to the multiplicity of important issues that required immediate attention (reconstruction of houses, return of refugees, infrastructure in the country), the civil-military relations were left on the margins. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a state, hence did not keep-up with the trends in Eastern Europe in respect to civil military relations.

State influence on the creation and development of civil-military relations is reflected in the normative basis and institutions, which regulate this complex issue. In the normative field, Bosnia and Herzegovina was from the very beginning hampered from regulating the civil-military relations, for it did not adopt its own Constitution – rather the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a result of the peace negotiations held in

Dayton in November 1995\(^2\). As shown below, no special attention during the negotiations was paid to the civil-military relationship. Hence, Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement (the Constitution) does not clearly define this relationship.

The situation is similar in respect to the establishment of institutions, which are tasked with the realization of civil-military relations. After the war, the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established, but it did not include a Committee for Defense and Security. The executive government was composed of only five ministries, which had nothing to do with the military. At the state level, the most significant institution, which deals with military issues, is the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM), but this institution also paid no attention to the establishment of civil-military relations.

As a result of war, weak economy, multiplicity of overlapping legal provisions and non-existence of state military institutions the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina could not exert significant influence on the creation of civil-military institutions.

\section{Internal Political and Ethnic Tensions}

In addition to legally and institutionally regulating civil-military relations, the state is also responsible for creating an atmosphere, which would determine the best possible model for democratic control of the security sector. Let me point out that the aim of democratic control is the \textit{democratic} and not only civil control of armed forces. However, control by civil authorities in itself is not enough. There are many countries in which civil structures are in the position of authority with armed forces subjugated to them while the society, as a whole is not democratic. Here I am particularly referring to the European states, which were formerly to the east of the ‘iron curtain’.

As a sovereign and an independent country, Bosnia and Herzegovina freed itself of the Communist heritage and introduced a multi-party system. Today, the armies of Bosnia and Herzegovina no longer have to guarantee the political monopoly of the Communists. However, by no account have the interior relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina been sorted out. Weak economy directly effects civil-military relations. Funds put aside for the armies of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not cover all the expenditures of

\footnote{General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was officially signed on 14 December 1995 in Paris, France.}