After 1914 at least seven prewar non-Marxist histories of Russia were republished. These included Kliuchevsky’s *Kratkii kurs*, Priselkov’s *Russkaia istoriia* (1915), and K. Sivkov’s *Russkaia istoriia* (1917-1918?).

During the 1920s, three original survey histories of Russia appeared. V. A. Algasov’s *Konspekt lektsii po istorii Rossii* (Kharkiv, 1924) was unavailable to me. Another, by Nikolai Rozhkov, actually his second multivolume history of Russia, was published in three editions between 1919 and 1930. Rozhkov focused on political events that could be related to socio-economic conditions and began his narrative with Kievan times. He attached no significance to the 1169 sack of Kiev and gave little attention to Ukrainian events. His account of the cossack period summarized the views of the Ukrainian historians M. Hrushevsky and O. Iefymenko and his original contribution to this subject was to have labeled these years the period of “gentry revolution” in Ukraine, and to see in Left-Bank development an instance of trade capitalism. Moscow, he explained, was driven by economic interests to the Black Sea.

Mikhail Pokrovsky’s prewar *Russkaia istoriia* was reprinted seven times to 1934 and once more in 1966. He also wrote the third original survey that appeared during the 1920s; a short popular history reprinted nine times in Russian between 1920 and 1933, and once more 1966. Including all translations, this book saw 90 printings. Pokrovsky devoted about one quarter of the text to the period before the eighteenth century, and made only fleeting mention of Ukraine, in sections on Russian foreign policy. He noted that the Khmelnytsky uprising differed from Russian popular revolts because there
were intellectuals in the Ukrainian leadership and that Russia subsequently
turned events to its advantage. Non-Russians disappear from his text until
the 1905 revolution.3

A “History of the Nations of the USSR” was written by N. M. Vanag,
Latvian Deputy Head of the Historical Section of the Institute of Red
Professors. His book focused on nineteenth- and twentieth-century affairs
and had only 70 pages on earlier centuries. A second volume supposed to
cover the years up to 1922 was never published. Vanag focused on socio-
economic development and his book was basically a socio-economic history
of Russia. He admitted in his introduction that he had not devoted sufficient
attention to non-Russians, but explained he had decided to publish nonetheless
because of the need for a one-volume survey covering all the peoples of
the USSR.

Vanag presented Russian relations with non-Russians in terms of “mili-
tary feudal” colonization by serf-landowners whose class interests led to the
formation of the empire through violent conquest.4 Vanag skirted political
events, and like Pokrovsky, explained that oppression led Ukrainian petty-
producers to take up arms together with the cossacks, whose aim was to
become a ruling class. The Treaty of 1654, which Russia signed only after
Ukraine had been exhausted, ended the “peasant war” and transferred
Ukrainian peasants from the hands of oppressive Polish lords to a “kabal of
Russian serf landowners” allied with cossack officers fearful of social
revolution. Left-Bank Ukraine subsequently became one of Russia’s most
important colonies. Vanag argued that national revolts in the empire were
“anti-feudal” but not “bourgeois democratic” or “national liberation” in
character despite distinct national tendencies, because capitalist relations in
the peasant economy had been weak and were kept so by colonial exploita-
tion. The cossack elite had not been “revolutionary,” while the peasants,
thanks to a patriarchal social structure, could not organize politically, attain
the status of free petty-producers and thereby give direction to their move-
ment. Yet their uprisings were not “reactionary” because at the time they
were the only moving force of the “historical process.”5

The first political organization representing the Ukrainian national bour-
goisie was the Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood, formed in a region of the
empire where “feudal remnants” were weak. As one of the non-Russian
territories in an empire where capitalism by the end of the nineteenth century
had developed into “imperialism,” Ukraine served as a source of raw
materials and markets for Russian capital. Vanag wrote that tsarist colonial
exploitation in the peripheries reinforced and perpetuated backwardness in
Russia itself. Ukraine, a region of “agrarian capitalist colonization,” experi-