I have perforce\textsuperscript{1} to concentrate my comments on Professor Davidson’s paper. My main comment on it is that it does not really make clear what the implications of his analysis are for how psychologists should spend their time. If his title ‘Psychology as Philosophy’ is meant to portend anything for the future of psychology I do not see quite why it should portend just this. Let me elaborate these points.

I will approach Professor Davidson’s paper by the somewhat roundabout route of saying something about Professor Koch’s. Professor Koch spends a lot of time developing the thesis that it has taken about fifty years of the dominance in psychology of behaviourism and neo-behaviourism to establish its sterility, irrelevance, and pretentiousness as the science of human behaviour. One of its main defects was the attempt to erect the study of human behaviour on a natural science type of methodology — particularly that prevalent in astronomy, mechanics and some branches of physics. This type of analysis requires ‘(a) the disembedding from a domain of phenomena of a small family of ‘variables’ which demarcate important aspects of the domain’s structure, when that domain is considered as an idealised, momentary static system; and (b) that this family of variables be such, by virtue of appropriate internal relations, that it can be ordered to a mathematical or formal system capable of correctly describing changes in selected aspects of the state of the system as a function of time and/or system changes describably as alterations of the ‘values’ of specified variables’. This

\textsuperscript{1} Professor Koch’s paper is very entertaining and relevant to the topic of the symposium. He was, however, prevented by illness from attending the conference.
pattern of analysis actually applies to few other sciences; it has proved a complete failure in almost all the main areas of psychology with, perhaps, the exception of ‘sensory psychology’ and some areas of ‘biological psychology’. But Koch’s inference is not that there are no legitimate and important domains of psychological study which can be empirical and objective and employ statistical and mathematical methods. It is only that the application of this particular natural science paradigm of astronomy and mechanics is inapplicable to most realms of psychological phenomena.

Professor Davidson adopts a restricted view of ‘behaviour’ which excludes phenomena such as dreaming, the expression of emotion, and reflexes. He concentrates on the area of human actions and gives reasons why this type of natural science pattern of analysis is inapplicable to their explanation. He does not stress the complexity of the variables and the fact that we are dealing with an open system — features which make precise prediction impossible in other sciences such as meteorology. Rather he rightly emphasises the impossibility of combining variables having different characteristics. What a person will do in a given situation depends both upon the strength of his wants and on the structure of his beliefs, to mention two of the types of variables involved. It might be possible to quantify the intensity of a person’s wants but, when beliefs have to be considered as well, we are dealing with questions of the individual’s appreciation of relevance, cogency, and weight of considerations, and so on, as well as with his concern for consistency and coherence. These notions have no counterpart in the world of physics. Yet it is because of them that we can combine together a desire and a belief of the right sort to explain an action.

Professor Davidson denies, too, that there are any ‘serious laws’ connecting reasons and actions; for although we presuppose in explanation an abstract postulate such as ‘If a man wants x and knows that a course of action abc will bring it about, then, other things being equal, he will do abc if this course of action is a possible one for him’; this is not what he calls ‘serious’ because in the use of physical laws such as the laws of motion, we can tell in advance whether the conditions hold. In the case of action, however, we have not