What is it to accept vulnerability to the power of another person? I, perhaps like the woman G. B. Shaw reproved (when in response to her gushing pronouncement 'I accept the universe!' he replied 'Madam, you had better!'), take acceptance to include not just the voluntary act, contrasted with the act of refusing, but also a near-welcoming of a situation that may or may not be in one's power to alter, an attitude contrasting with anxiety, or resentment of one's situation. Is acceptance of being in another's power still too complex a matter to attribute to a newborn? And if it is attributable, can it count as trust, or does it, as Lagerspetz would have us believe, contaminate complete trust by the possibly disturbing thought of the power of the other? When, as a first approximation to what I took trust to be, I called it 'accepted vulnerability to another's possible but not expected ill will (or lack of good will) to one,' I certainly did not mean to imply that trust has to be initiated by a voluntary act of acceptance, as one might accept an offer of marriage, nor that scenarios of possible betrayal must pass through the truster's mind. Indeed, when I went on in a much criticized second approximation to take trusting to be implicit entrusting of something one values to the care of another, I went out of my way to try to cancel the suggestions of choice and explicitness that come with the concept of entrusting. This was partly so that I could accommodate the relatively unselfconscious cases of trust, and the spontaneous trust of infants for their mothers.

I liked the notion of entrusting because it encouraged us to answer the question of what the trusted is expected to do, what valued good she is to take care of. I granted that sometimes the as-it-were entrusted good would be only notionally separate from the truster or the trusted (as when I entrust my safety to the plane crew, or entrust the continuation of the
conversation to my co-symposiast). Certainly I did not suggest that whenever we trust there are 'piece goods' which are entrusted. Among the entrusted goods I mentioned were security, one's children's loyalty to one, the quality of an ongoing cultural activity such as conversation or music. In a later paper I wrote that the belief that another's will toward one is good (a belief that trust involves), 'is itself a good, not merely instrumentally but in itself'. I see no reason not to agree with Lagerspetz that among the valued things we could entrust is a particular trust relationship itself, so that its destruction could be the worst hurt and loss to the betrayed person. But it will be a particular trust relationship, and so it will take some particular sort of unexpected and hurtful act for that trust to be betrayed. The action or inaction that betrays the trust will always merit some other description that tells us how the trust was betrayed (and so tells us what was entrusted), such as 'she lied to him,' 'she told his secrets to his enemies,' 'she turned his children against him'.

What sort of occurrent thoughts are compatible with trusting someone? Lagerspetz is sure that 'If she so chooses, she could hurt me' is not compatible with trust. Would 'I feel safe with her' be allowed? Or is that too close to 'I trust her,' which he thinks would occur only in the face of 'trouble and temptation'? Lagerspetz thinks we must start our philosophical account of trust with 'unreflected trust,' and says that I 'make rather little of the lack of reflection and awareness that often characterizes trust'. I did however claim that all trust grows from infant unreflective trust, a capacity for which I took to be innate, and Lagerspetz quotes my claim that recognition of trust is often 'posthumous'. He is inclined to make the real thing necessarily recognized only posthumously, and very many thoughts will be thoughts too many for the truster, if he is right – thoughts of the trusted's power, thoughts about what other trusters have suffered, questions about the trustworthiness of the trusted one, even if such questions get answered unhesitatingly and positively. Must we take dumb, blind, spontaneous infant trust not just as an important precondition of more articulate and open-eyed trust, but as the only genuine article? Other critics have attacked me for allowing the infant attitude to be any sort of trust, but they tended to be ones who liked the entrusting