

E. HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY
ON THE UNIVERSAL LIFE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
IN REFLECTION AND IN TIME

Husserl's phenomenological philosophy aspired to an establishment of the universal immanence in research of consciousness. The absolutely immanent as it is represented in Husserl's work *Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* in the first book, cannot for the present apply to an explanation of a sanguineous life of consciousness since the description of consciousness does not bridge the gap between the natural and transcendental as mutually exclusive objectives. In *Cartesianische Meditationen* Husserl makes an attempt to overcome the already numbed Kant's dualism concerning empirical and transcendental knowledge by means of Descartes's ideas. And then again the themes of reflection and time come to the fore with him. Thus it will be a question about the universal life of consciousness where the importance of universal structures of consciousness for an explanation of its functional nature can be described.

According to Husserl, the description of the transcendental experience means its fulfilment. And what cannot be described, is deprived of sense and concerns the sphere of prejudices. So the description "is called to become the basis of radical and universal criticism".¹ Descartes's idea of philosophy as a universal, apodictic ally grounded science needs radical liberation from a natural prejudice of experience about the world. The idea proclaimed by Descartes has received its further embodiment in Kantian transcendental philosophy. However, such prejudice being universal, even Kant remains an adherent of empirical and transcendental knowledge dualism. But phenomenology as it is understood by Husserl, is called to recreate "*the universe of absolute unprejudice*"², in which, as a result of carrying out comprehensive criticism, the opportunity of the description of natural and transcendental knowledge distinctions disappears with pure evidence.

Husserl's phenomenological philosophy distinguishes the following mental processes which can be denominated as reflection: (1) acts of analysis of

the stream of experiences; (2) the methods of cognition of consciousness in general; (3) kinds of experiences.³

Reflection as a process of determining specifically distinct experiences becomes a leitmotif of the phenomenological analysis of the universal structures of consciousness. And here gnosiological strategy has to do with the shaping of the vast continuity in the specific peculiarities of experiences in accordance with the parameters of a discrete modus of reflection. Reflexion as a method of cognition of absolute consciousness becomes objectified after having been studied in the phenomenological reduction. In the first instance all the modi of the immanent catching of essence and immanent experience proper will be treated as reflection. Acts of analysis of the stream of experiences bears the name of reflection so long as in essence they are immanent perceptions.

The statuses of reflection as an act, method and a kind of analysis of experiences seems to exhaust all the modifications of consciousness. All possible modifications of consciousness result in the acquisition of an initial given, i.e., an invariable type of essence. But reflection must prove its "absolute right" to consider such givenness.

It should be observed that from the phenomenological standpoint the adducing of arguments in favour of particular propositions under discussion is not capable of proof, for "the scale of truth is absolute lucidity".⁴ So there is no point in pinning one's hopes on reflection to guarantee the existence of experiences or the universal structures of consciousness. Pure intuition, initial in its significance, cannot be replaced by reflection. Whatever arguments might be, only statements correctly expressing an initial givenness are meaningful and in accord with the truth. Pure intuition and immanent reflection are intentionally different complementary means of acquiring phenomenological truth. They can be regarded as two questions: "What can we know?" and "What is it in fact?" If these questions were identical in their meaning, cognition would be senseless since its objective would be an achieved result. The meaning of phenomenological cognition is, as it were, in the narrowing or widening of the clearance between intuition and reflection.

Side by side with the absolute right of reflection to consider an initial phenomenological given, "the absolute right of immanent retention"⁵ of continuing givens is recognized. Phenomenology aims at dealing with continuing givens whose nature is realized temporally: "still" living and having "just" formed. The phase of retention of the initiality of an experience is a constant essential type of existence of experience. Retention enables us to retain a continuing given in the living "now" of an experience. Just as reflection in natural consciousness presupposes temporal distinctions, phenomenological