

THE CATEGORY OF THE (NON-)TEMPORAL «NOW»  
IN PHILOSOPHY OF THE 'LATE' HUSSERL

As the first philosopher, Husserl changes grammatical qualification of the «now» category. He defines the «now» category as a noun. The «now» is a noun not only as a specific term of philosophy of time, but also as a part of speech, which we ask a question 'what?' not 'when?'. The «now» is not a noun because it is a category which we include in our philosophical vocabulary. The Husserlian «now» is a noun because, substantially, replies to in form of question 'what?'. For this reason, in the evolution of the «now» category in works of Husserl, we can not find any contradictions. The difference between early and late works of Husserl concerns only a manner of depiction the «now» category. In passing, I take note of a moment when Husserl gives up diagrammatic depiction of the theory of time. The category of the «now» constituting time is a background of an intentional act which is characterized retentionally-protentionally. A giving up a retentional-protentional time is not actually but methodological.

According to Husserl, flow of time is represented by a row of consecutive and *successive* points of time. In his theory of time, the future is later than the past, the past is earlier than the «now». The past and the future, on the one hand, and the «now», on the other, do not possess the same nature: the «now» is not a border between the past and the future, in Husserlian theory of time, but the «now» is the only present time of creator of time. The main difficulty lies in the fact that this row can not be characterized in temporal terminology; it seems to me that it can not be characterized in this way for two reasons. (1) The «now» (also in the retentional-protentional setting) is the smallest unit that a consciousness measures the constituted time. (2) Consciousness can not measure constituted time by means of the «now» defined as category of time. The «now» does not answer to question 'when?'. Well, the «now» has to answer to different question than 'when?'. According to Husserl (in definition of the «now» in the retentional-protentional setting as well as in *lebendige Gegenwart*) the «now» answers to question 'what?'.

## 1.

I will use as example a birth of individual consciousness (supposing an individual is not the eternal monad). I am not interested in time as constituting of my universal sense of the world, at the moment, that is, the sense which relates to my retention-protention, the sense which relates to my consciousness of the flowing time, as well to the socialised and the inter-subjective time. I am only interested in a feeling of time in his specific «now».

I can go on to a situation of subject (for example, the situation of a baby, who consciousness is just being born – cf. Husserl 1973: 604–605). There is such *Nullpunkt* of his or her consciousness in which appears *Einfühlung* connected with the self-consciousness.

In phenomenology that goes after Husserl we cannot point at consideration beside immanent time. Thus consideration of the birth of the consciousness of time conducts to some difficulties. Namely, we deal with two different conditions of the consciousness of time. (1) The consciousness of the first non-temporal «now»: *being the form of the pure non-temporal «now»*, and (2) the consciousness of the temporal «now» in retentional-protentional time: *being the form of the non-temporal «now» between before and after*.

The non-temporal (that is pre-temporal for consciousness of time) existence is the absolute existence. Also, there is no contradiction between the consciousness of the first «now» and the consciousness of the «now» in retentional-protentional time. In both cases, the consciousness uses the «now» as a noun. Nevertheless we deal with two qualitative different conditions: (1) the condition of the consciousness outside the retentional-protentional time of the first «now» and (2) the condition of the consciousness of my consciousness outside retentional-protentional time.

We can realize the bipolarity of such structure: (1a) The existence in the *Nullpoint* is the pure (pre-temporal) and unconditional reception of reality, and (1b) we deal with a reference to the *Nullpoint* as a basis of the interpretation. On the one hand, the consciousness is blind because it does not know retentional-protentional perspective, on the second hand, the consciousness outside retentional-protentional time is the intentional correlate for the consciousness of time. (2) The objectivisation of the first level takes place outside the time; the objectivisation of the second one takes place above the time. The second kind of the objectivisation exceeds the monolinear pattern of a sheer succession in «now» of the acts since each reference to primordial temporality supposes a continuity of an action. The action is deprived of a limited perspective of retention- «now» -protention