

DECONSTRUCTION OF THE LOGOCENTER OF ALL
 GROUNDS CONSTRUCTED BY LANGUAGE HABITS
 LANGUAGE-GAME THE SURROUNDINGS OF WHICH
 IS EVERYWHERE, THE CENTER OF WHICH
 IS NOWHERE

“Language-game” as a presentation of aspects of the life of language from the deconstructed standpoint of the logocentric habits of thinking and imagining that are intertwined to the picturing of surroundings by the use of concepts. Reviewing and tracing the movements of imagination structuring itself between pictures of imagination about the reality of language on the one hand, and reality itself on the other – in contrast and comparison with the deconstruction of imagination habits by means of clarifications about how the pictures operate and represent anything in the life of language.

The description “language-game” is a term in Wittgenstein’s language(-game) dealing with the *reality pictures* which are imagined (due to the bewitchment of our intelligence by language habits) about thinking, about physics, about language itself, about logical rules, about the reality of anything pictured by the use of concepts. Accordingly, Wittgenstein points out: “philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language.”¹ It is concerned with the particular ways and presuppositions of *imagining* and thinking these pictures as if they are fundamental representations, or “essences”, or “fundamental grounds” which are supposed to be sharing the same logical form or structure with reality. What goes with these ways of thinking and its presuppositions is the tendency to identify them in the final analysis with Reality, as if their logical forms or structures are perceived and reflected in the representing picture, i.e., by the logical form of a proposition. The term “picture” suggests that the representing relation is the similarity (isomorphism) between the picture and what it represents.² Wittgenstein later went further to clarify the concept of “similarity” on the basis of shared human actions and reactions that express themselves with

certain shared consequences that start from childhood primitive reactions, i.e., in the form of picking and separating the objects (toys) of “similar” or “same” colour. He, also clarified that a “colour sample” represents its being a sample of a colour by the use of the sample, i.e., by its comparisons with objects of similar or different colours and their consequences in the manifold ways of using and playing with them. The criterion of its being a “colour sample”, (a colour concept as such) shows itself by how the sample is used and compared in accordance with the similar or shared uses of other people. The same idea is valid for all concepts, i.e., for the concept of “standard meter” also, which is represented by how it is used rather than the stick by itself. The sample whether of standard meter or a colour represents a concept with how it is used and with the consequences interwoven with the surrounding system of language. Disconnected from the use and its consequences interwoven with the surroundings, it cannot even be shown as something, as a sample of anything. In other words there is no such a privileged sample, or object to represent or instantiate itself ideally, without the mediation of its use which is interwoven with language. Even the signs of showing and pointing makes sense in connection with what comes before and what follows in the vicinity, with the surroundings of showing, in the system of language-game. This is not only true for the things to be shown conceptually by the signs, but also for the signs to be signs, to signify as signs. A sign’s being a sign also shows itself in how it is used and in the consequences interwoven with the language-game. The sign ➡ does not by itself indicate the right direction in the way in which our seeing it seems to be directed as soon as we see the sign, which results from the automatical habits acquired by learning the use of the sign.

What the sign represents, the meaning or logical form pictured by the sign, is pictured by what the people do, or how they act with it. It is not something to be identified with a logical form to be read from pictures and symbols, but it is about understanding *the state of affairs*, the background surroundings for something to be indicated, read or shown as something significantly, whether as a sign or an object in the foreground. Hence a reality picture supposed to be formerly held as represented by the shared logical form of a proposition with reality (the logical forms of which are held to be determined by the metaphysical supposition of the “configurations of objects” in the *Tractatus*) is later clarified by means of the kind of use or operations or play with the surroundings; the kind of play in which the player comes to arrange, to articulate, to “scribe” and to “read” so to speak, a horizon through which a surrounding world appears as differentiated by reactions and their consequences into the domains of subjectivity and objectivity, into objects of