

## PHENOMENOLOGY: THE RETURN TO THE LIVING SOUL

As it is known the self-determination of the New European philosophy was accompanied by its “divorce” with the Christian religion. This event had very significant consequences. Some of them were positive for philosophy, for its further development, but some of them were negative, creating a threat of its transformation from the living thinking in the lifeless, nihilistic abstract metaphysics. From the point of view of such threat the most dangerous was a loss of the Christian notion of the living soul inherited by Christianity, in its turn, from Plato. The process of the recognizing of this loss and as result of the returning to the living soul in philosophy was difficult and long. Its beginning was laid by the Kantian metaphysical system. The philosophical process after Kant was characterized by the attempts to find the main source of contradictions inherent to his system. The quest was gone in various directions. One of them has led to that in frames of the New European philosophy from the middle of 19-th century it began to come into view the outlines of the phenomenological problem in wide sense, as a problem of the thinking of the alive. These somewhat vague outlines acquired clarity in Husserl’s conception, phenomenological in accurate sense of this word.

The problematic situation made by Kant in philosophy consists in that there was a gap between two levels of the “pure” metaphysical reason in his system, between the “theoretical” and the “practical” reason. Just here, in the realm of this gap a problem has arisen. On the base of his analysis of the theoretical reason Kant comes to conclusion that it has no ability to comprehend its subjects, i.e. the reason’s essences. Inasmuch as the theoretical reason does not possess the faculty, that is a determinative characteristic of the reason in itself, it proved to be defective, insolvent in comparison with the practical one. Accordingly Kant asserts that the soul as a reason’s essence and as one of the main metaphysical subjects may be comprehended only according to principals of application of the practical reason, but not of the theoretical one. However, in order to understand the Kantian thesis about theoretical incomprehensibility of the soul correctly it is necessary to make more precise

what essence the speech is about in it. The matter is that in limits of the Kantian metaphysical system we have deal with the reason's essences, which have different statuses, or ranks. It is very important to keep to Kant's own distinction of the essences.

The main principle of Kant's philosophy is the principle of delimitation of "the appearance" and "the essence". It is called often the main critical principle. At the same according to Kant time it is a principle of delimitation of the sensible in all its displays (external contemplation, introspection) and the insensible. All reason's essences are, naturally, insensible. However the insensible character of the reason's essences are understood by Kant differently depending on what reason's act (the theoretical or the practical) correlates with either essence. To each level of "the architectonics" of the reason a particular sort of the essences corresponds, which is got, consequently, by a particular way of purifying from all the sensible. In fact in one case it is the essences, which it is possible to call "out of -sensible", in another case the speech is about the essences which have "over-sensible" character. A distinction of two species of the insensible and, accordingly, of the transcendental, is a key moment of Kant's thought. The theoretical out of-sensible essence is a result of such exit out limits of the sensible that has, so to speak, the "horizontal" directionality. It is that what remains after complete abstracting from the sensible. This essence has absolutely abstract character.

However, it should not forget that the out of-sensible essences entered by Kant into "the vertical" space of true metaphysics, receives the metaphysical dimension. It is reached just thanks to the thesis about incomprehensibility of the theoretical reason's subjects, about the disability of the theoretical reason to answer the question of its subjects' reality. The theoretical essences have true metaphysical sense only in that case if they are thought as incomprehensible in selves-beings. To understand them as comprehensible would mean to ascribe to them the mode of substance's existence, i.e. to naturalize them and to turns them into the objects of knowledge, that it is absolutely impermissible from Kant's critical position. The metaphysical function of the theoretical reason is to regulate the process of knowledge, to lead it by limiting the pretensions to perceive the out of-sensible essences like the sensible objects. And this function has only critical, negative character. So, according to Kant the abstract out of-sensible essences are, on the one hand, unknowable because they are just reason's essences. On the other hand, they are incomprehensible by the "pure" metaphysical reason too because they are abstract. The task of the theoretical reason is to keep the understanding of abstract character of the out of-sensible essences. It is forbidden to ascribe to them the empirical,