In the words of Husserl himself, the *Logical Investigations* were the “breakthrough” to phenomenology. Without a doubt, the overcoming of psychologism, which is to say its refutation as well as the non-contradictory realization of its legitimate motivations, opened the way to an as yet unprecedented phenomenology. Despite the astonishing number of phenomena considered in the *Investigations*, and despite the concern to do justice to the diversity of their modes of givenness, one can say that all these “phenomena,” as they are understood by this new phenomenology, are finally bound to one single venture. This venture, which the *Investigations* set in action, is characterised notably by its great distrust vis-à-vis every metaphysical position and by a corresponding resolve to respect the multidimensionality of phenomena.

For the phenomenology of the *Investigations*, the phenomenon ultimately stands out on a horizon originally interweaving different dimensions. Interwoven there are the dimensions of lived experience, the givenness of the things-themselves, and the mediation of their relation by linguistic significations. Despite their entanglement, these different points of view on the phenomenon are irreducible to one another. The fundamental error of psychologism was not therefore to have brought logical idealities into relation with subjective experiences but to have reduced them to psychological facts. ¹ The opposite reduction of every judgment or reasoning to its logical content thus hardly fares any better. The breakthrough of phenomenology must be just as much an overcoming of logicism as of psychologism.

For the *Investigations*, the phenomenon as it is conceived by phenomenology can be made to reside neither in consciousness nor in the world of empirical or ideal states of affairs nor in the meanings and expressions of language. Yet if this is so, it is nevertheless necessary that the interweaving between these different dimensions, from which the phenomenon proceeds, be able to appear in its own right. While making

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intentional consciousness into the setting of this manifestation, the *Investigations* do not for all that go on to reduce this original interweaving to only one of its components. One should thus make the distinction between, on the one hand, a consciousness which is inseparable from the thing and from the meanings which guide its apprehension, and, on the other hand, a properly phenomenological consciousness which welcomes the appearance of the intertwining between the different dimensions of the ordinary phenomenon. This distinction between two sorts of intentional consciousness, and thus between two sorts of phenomenon, constitutes the veritable breakthrough which makes phenomenology into something other than a mere descriptive psychology. This breakthrough is only truly accomplished in the sixth investigation, to which we will devote the greater part of our analyses.

The sixth investigation, therefore, does not just complete the analysis of intentional acts in the fifth investigation by way of a consideration of intuitive acts, and more particularly, of sensible and categorial perceptions. In fact, its “Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge” examines the intentional act straight away from the perspective of its interweaving with the things-themselves and with names or concepts. By treating the relation between sensibility and the understanding, between the subjective and objective conditions of knowledge, and between the theory of meaning and formal and material ontologies, the sixth investigation does not only take up the different lines examined separately in the preceding investigations. It also faces up to the major problems of traditional philosophy. This brings it, quite naturally, to reflect upon the properly phenomenological character of its own approach to these problems. In this way, the sixth investigation initiates, prior to the introduction of the doctrine of the transcendental reduction, the meditation on a “phenomenology of phenomenology” that will be pursued throughout Husserl’s work.

Treating the interweaving between consciousness, things, and language in light of intentional consciousness, the phenomenology of knowledge thus finds itself confronted with the double function of consciousness: as subjective aiming at an object and as the horizon for the appearance of the interweaving between subject, object and meaning. The appearance of this interweaving being precisely what Husserl calls “truth,” we will be brought to question the nature of this consciousness which is the setting for the event of truth. Since an intuitive consciousness of the thing-itself does not yet constitute, by itself, a consciousness of truth, we will have to clarify the nature of this second consciousness which gives a truth value to an intuition.

For Husserl, this second consciousness is called “synthetic consciousness of the intuitive fulfilment of an intention.” We will try to show that the desire—for truth rather than sight—plays a prevalent role

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