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CONTROL IN MODERN GREEK: IT'S ANOTHER GOOD MOVE*

1. INTRODUCTION: EXPLANATION THROUGH DEDUCTION

The Minimalist Program advances explanatory adequacy to the extent that stipulative principles and filters of GB are deduced from the smallest number of simple, 'natural' axioms. Fundamental among these are:

(i) Sound and meaning are ineliminable: there are lexical features and properties.
(ii) There is a (recursive) structure building operation: Merge (A & B) produces C.
(iii) The language faculty interacts with external systems: to be usable, the objects of the syntactic component must be legible to the interfaces.

Thus, Minimalist methodology involves deducing as much as possible from irreducible lexical properties, from the (required) structure building operation, and from the conceptually necessary interfaces (LF and PF). As Epstein and Seely (2002:2) in reviewing the Minimalist Program put it: 'The goal is to minimize each premise, and the number of them, thereby seeking to maximize explanation through deduction.'

Our paper is a case study in this reductivist mode of explanation relative to subjunctive *na* clauses (henceforth *na* clauses) in Modern Greek. We are concerned with properties of the embedded clause in (1)[1]:

(1) o Yanis theli [*na* kalesi tus filus tu
the-NOM John-NOM want-3SG/PRES NA invite-3SG/PRES the-ACC friends-ACC his
sta genethlia tu]
at the-ACC birthday-ACC his
'John wants to invite his friends to his birthday party'

The key phenomenon involves the fact that in some cases the *na* clause behaves like an obligatory control (OC) infinitival, while in other cases it behaves like a non-obligatory control (NOC) clause, even though the two types of *na* clauses are indistinguishable relative to their surface morphology; i.e. they look the same but they do not behave the same. There is a classic GB analysis that attempts to explain these behaviors, and one of our goals is to reveal previously unnoted problems with this analysis (problems which, in fact, carry over to recent Minimalist accounts).

Our central goal, however, is as follows: Within an explanatory and reductivist Minimalist framework, we attempt to deduce the properties of *na* clauses appealing to the following simple, natural lexical property:

W.D. Davies and S. Dubinsky (eds.), New Horizons in the Analysis of Control and Raising, 133–157.

(2a) Certain predicates select a phi-defective Agr (in their complement)

We combine this with the hypothesis in (2b).

(2b) 'Degrees of Agreement': Overt agreement morphology and abstract Agr are related via **individual** phi-features, not the phi-complex as a whole.

Simply put: If a feature F is present in the surface representation, then F is present underlyingly. If F is not present on the surface, then F may or may not be present underlyingly depending on what indirect evidence for F's existence we find, including, among other things, the control phenomena that we consider in this paper.

It is an irreducible property of certain predicates that they select defective Agr, i.e. Agr contains less than the complete set of three abstract phi-features [person], [gender], [number]. Phi-complete Agr occurs elsewhere. We argue that this simple featural distinction goes a surprisingly long way in deducing, and hence explaining, in the sense indicated above, the properties of *na* clauses; and has consequences beyond.

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present what we consider a classic GB analysis of *na* clauses, that of Varlokosta (1993). Section 3 introduces a series of problems for this GB analysis. Our alternative, reductive Minimalist analysis, is detailed in section 4. Section 5 presents certain challenges for our approach and conclusions.

2. A CLASSIC GB ANALYSIS OF *na* CLAUSES

Varlokosta (1993) 'Control in Modern Greek' (CMG) develops a GB analysis of *na* clauses.[2] Recall that *na* clauses come in two varieties: those that display OC properties and those that show NOC[3] (cf. Spyropoulos this volume). Relative to the overt morphology of the verb within the *na* clause, they are identical. For CMG, the properties of these two types of *na* clauses reduce to hypothesized differences between OC PRO on the one hand vs. *pro* on the other. CMG first adopts the contention that PRO is anaphoric (Bouchard 1984) and that it therefore displays OC properties. Like other pure anaphors then, PRO must have an antecedent; its antecedent must c-command it; it does not allow split antecedents; and so on. Alternatively, since *pro* is pronominal, it displays NOC properties (e.g. it may refer deictically, it may take split antecedents).These properties are summarized in Table 1. Given this, the trick is to guarantee that PRO is the subject of OC, while the subject position of the NOC *na* clause, if empty, is necessarily *pro*.

Table 1. OC and NOC Properties of na clauses

The empty subject of the na clause	*OC na clauses*	*NOC na clauses*
Alternates with overt subject	No (ia)	Yes (ib)
Allows deictic reference	No (iia)	Yes (iib)
Must have a c-commanding antecedent	Yes (iiia)	No (iiib)
Allows split antecedents	No (iva)	Yes (ivb)
Permits both sloppy and strict readings	No (va) (only sloppy)	Yes (vb)
Allows *de se* and non-*de se* readings	No (via) (only *de se*)	Yes (vib)