At the beginning of the Advanced Research Workshop, I would like to speak to you about the key issue of arms control: It is the relationship with strategic and generally military stability. We must discuss this complex relationship in practical terms.

There is the stability of arms control and there is the crisis stability of a given force relationship, the balance of military options or, generally, a crisis stability of deterrence. Both need not mean the same and can even be mutually exclusive. Hence, there always is the requirement for harmonizing arms control objectives and methods with strategy and military criteria for defence and stability of given relationships.

Let me quote one of the chief negotiators in arms control in recent years, Ambassador Paul Nitze, on this point. He says, 'consistent with the objectives of promoting stability and rough equality - he is, of course, talking about the SALT experience - arms control should aim to achieve sharp reductions in the levels or armaments. Reductions per se may not always be good. For example, reductions in the number of launchers can be destabilizing if they increase the ratio of warheads to vulnerable launchers. But well-conceived proposals embodying reductions which bring about improvements in the proper indices can do much to enhance stability'.

Let me take up perhaps the most recent example of what Paul Nitze had in mind when he traced his experience; that is the Gorbachev proposal on reduction in strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear force buildings and in strategic systems of the three component categories included in the definition of the strategic force relationship. Gorbachev has proposed, as you know, the reduction of strategic delivery vehicles by 50% and a definite ceiling on warheads on such strategic delivery vehicles at 6000 and a definite limitation of each component SLBM, ICBM and aircraft to carry only 60% of the overall, meaning 3600 warheads.
The first question one has to ask is how are strategic delivery vehicles defined? Which are the criteria? And here we are presented with a re-definition of the agreed terms under the SALT-Agreements which define the strategic systems in a pragmatic, technical way: In one case with the criterion of a minimal geographical distance between two landmasses and that means roughly 5500 km for land-based missile systems. And another, a very technical criterion, concerning nuclear powered submarines carrying modern sea-launched ballistic missiles, has been introduced in 1964. So, these are the criteria for the definition of strategic arms under the 1972 SALT I-Agreement and these criteria definitions have been written into the Vienna SALT Treaty and are still valid, at least until the end of this year unless the two partners agreed to further observe the stipulations of the treaty beyond the end of 1985.

The Gorbachev proposal as it has been of late explained by the Soviet Delegation in Geneva attempts at a comprehensive re-definition of strategic systems, a definition that is not consistent with SALT, but would translate the Soviet forward-based systems claim on American delivery vehicles, launchers and aircraft outside the territory of the United States according to the Soviet criteria of 'all systems are strategic if and when they can reach the territory of the other side'. The Soviets have tried to include this definition into the SALT-Agreements since 1969 and they have not succeeded in doing this.

However, in the Vladivostoc Guideline of 1974 when the forward-based systems issue was again laid aside, an understanding was reached that in the next negotiation, in SALT III, as it was called then, the forward-based systems issue would be taken up and come under negotiations. And that was the final understanding when the Vienna Agreement was signed so that in 1979 it was understood by both sides that, once the SALT process would be continued by a third comprehensive negotiation, all the matters settled in the protocol and the Soviet forward-based systems claim would come under review and eventually become subject of the negotiation.

When the START negotiation began in 1981 the Russians introduced the forward-based system theme as a subject for the negotiation. Between 1981 and 1983, both sides tabled proposals. The issue how to count or whether to count so-called forward-based systems in comprehensive strategic arms reductions was not substantially discussed since.