Applying the method of “historico-teleological” reflection or intentional analysis to the growth of Husserl’s philosophy, Berger disengages predominant motives which, to be sure, are not elaborated and explicitly formulated before the final and definitive phase of Husserl’s evolution (viz., that of transcendental phenomenology) is reached, but which may, and must, be discerned throughout the whole development of Husserl’s thought, though, of course, in a more or less implicit, rather anticipatory and germinal form. The quest of an ultimate and absolute foundation and justification of knowledge, first of logical and mathematical knowledge, later of scientific knowledge at large and even of prescientific experience, has been a persistent occupation of Husserl. From his first beginnings in philosophy, Husserl turned to the realm of subjectivity for his foundation and justification. The problem is to account for the validity of knowledge and the objectivity of the objects of knowledge in terms of acts of consciousness through which the objects are apprehended and knowledge is constituted. It is to this orientation towards both the subjective and objective aspects of experience and knowledge that Farber also calls attention when, in his *Foundation of Phenomenology*, he speaks of the persistence of Husserl’s “dual interest.”

To satisfy this interest and adequately to formulate the problems involved, Husserl had to go the long way from his psychological attempts
in *Philosophie der Arithmetik*\(^2\) to the definitive disclosure and final understanding of *transcendental subjectivity* as the realm in which all foundation and justification is to be sought, an extramundane realm, and not one worldly domain among others. In the perspective of Berger’s “historico-teleological reflection,” the *Logische Untersuchungen* appears to be a decisive phase of this evolution. Not merely is the idea conceived of a discipline bearing upon consciousness and yet radically different from psychology, and not only are the foundations of this new discipline laid down, but also, and chiefly, the true character of this new discipline is, in some degree, already anticipated. Discussing the subjective conditions of the possibility of a theory in general, Husserl speaks of *ideale Bedingungen, die in der Form der Subjektivität überhaupt und in deren Beziehung zur Erkenntnis wurzeln.*\(^3\) Referring to this passage, Berger—rightly, I believe—sees in it an anticipatory formulation of what was later to become transcendental subjectivity.

In his later writings, Husserl has established the method of “intentional analysis” or of “explicitation of implications” as the phenomenological method par excellence. Every act of consciousness points beyond itself in that what appears through this act, its meaning or signification, is not self-contained (the term meaning or signification taken in the broad and inclusive sense in which it has come to be used in phenomenology.) For a given meaning or signification to be rendered fully intelligible (intelligibility being the only concern of phenomenology), it is necessary that its implications be rendered explicit, i.e., that the other meanings and significations be disclosed which are presupposed by the meaning to be clarified according to its own nature and sense, and that in every concrete case there be brought out the specific nature of the ideal relationship of implication and reference as involved in the case under discussion. Given a certain meaning, it must be shown which other meanings are necessarily required for the former to have the sense it actually has. Berger finds the beginnings of this method as early as in *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, when

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