Chapter Three argued that agreement and anti-agreement are functors with distinct consequences — agreement requires that the members of its argument share properties and yields a result with a single value for these properties; anti-agreement requires that the members of its argument have different properties and yields a result with an added value, drawn collectively from the members of the argument. The effect of agreement was demonstrated on the Constituent and the effect of anti-agreement on the Argument Structure. Chapter Four applied both to the analysis of the Luiseño Proposition. Given a display of the person and number values in the Propositional Radical (what I have called the agreement grid), agreement yields a temporal value for the Proposition; anti-agreement yields a person/number value, the Subject. Chapter Five showed how the result of agreement and anti-agreement for the Proposition solve the aux compatibility problem introduced in Chapter One. The Luiseño aux is sensitive to just those properties represented in the Proposition’s formal value — its temporal value, its Subject person/number value, and the presence and properties of the non-Subject chain.

Because agreement and anti-agreement are obligatory and listable, but non-localizable, functors, the result of their application is syntactically inaccessible but phonologically accessible. Chapters Three and Four presented a single test for a syntactically accessible category in Luiseño; any such category (in Luiseño, Constituent, Argument Structure, and Proposition) can be an argument in a rule which adds a Constituent compatible with its person/number value. For the Constituent, this is the rule which yields (1b) from (1a):

(1) a. pokaamay ‘his son’
   b. ya’ash pokaamay ‘the man’s son’

for the Argument Structure this is the rule which yields (2b) from (2a):

(2) a. noo p potaanay yawq
   I aux his:blanket has
   I have his blanket.

   b. noo p ya’ash potaanay yawq
   I aux man his:blanket has
   I have the man’s blanket.
and for the Proposition this is the rule which yields (3b) from (3a).

(3) a. potaax upil 'ariquș
          himself aux was:kicking
    He was kicking himself.

    b. ya'ash upil potaax 'ariquș
          man aux himself was:kicking
    The man was kicking himself.

Through an analysis of Luiseño embedding, Chapter Six provided a much more elaborate test. Any category of this type in Luiseño defines a domain for embedding — Constituent defines the domain for a relative clause; Argument Structure, the domain for a complement clause; and Proposition, the domain for an adjunct clause. Further, the character of the defining domain, in conjunction with the accessibility of the embedded Proposition in the domain, provides a uniform treatment of temporal and Subject control. In short, Constituent, Argument Structure, and Proposition are necessary to an analysis of embedding and present precisely the correct properties. The similarity across the three categories is a natural consequence of the similarity in their functor type, given the idea that the functor type predicts the category type of the result.

Although the discussion has been concerned with certain of the details of Luiseño, it is critical to remember that two sets of theoretical proposals are on the table and that these are in no sense language particular. One set has to do with the idea that functors can be conditions across their arguments and that different kinds of conditions have different effects on their result. The second set involves a conception of grammatical architecture where functors and categories can be classified into types and where the properties of functors (their type) determine, in a general way, the character of the results of their action (the category type) on appropriate arguments.

In this, the concluding, chapter, I consider the application of these ideas (albeit briefly) in a broader domain. I engage also in speculations as to which aspects of the Luiseño analysis embedded within these hypotheses might generalize.

1. ARCHITECTURAL CONCLUSIONS

I have demonstrated these two sets of theoretical ideas by considering agreement and anti-agreement. Within this theory agreement and anti-agreement have a natural place; they are functors of a particular type which yield categories of a particular type. I note, however, that agreement and anti-agreement need not exhaust the functors characterized as obliga-