Realism, the dominant 20th century position in Anglo-American thought, is, in the relevant sense, a one world position. There exists a unique actual world, or reality, external to "us", which not only determines how things are locally and globally, but determines as well truth, and thus also uniquely fixes correctness in science, the correct theory being that which corresponds to reality. Anti-realisms such as idealism and phenomenalism reject, in one way or another, the tricky externality requirement. Relativism and pluralism, by contrast, reject one of the uniqueness requirements, but in significantly different ways. Relativism resists, in one fashion or another, the imposition of any ranking better than "equally good" and of any rankings warranting differential choice, on the multiple interpretations or, very differently, multiple realities or worlds disclosed. Pluralism, however, to set down at once the crucial contrast, permits and typically makes rankings, which enable choice (including realist and idealist and theist choices, among many others). Pluralism thus comes in two distinct forms: theory or meta-pluralism, according to which there are many correct theories (especially larger philosophical positions) but at most one actual world; and radical or deep pluralism which goes to the root of these differences in correctness, to be found in things, and discerns a plurality of actual worlds as well as of theories.

Realism, then, characteristically involves not only the (existential) claim that there is an actual world with various prized properties such as externality and mind-independence; but it further involves the claim that there is only one such world, that the world is unique. The uniqueness claim is essential: otherwise Reality is not fully determinate, and the actual world cannot perform expected realist functions of determining truth, correctness and the like, in a way that is single-valued and entire. It is the rarely considered, but normally simply assumed, uniqueness claim that is a main focus of concern here. It will be contended that uniqueness fails, that not only is uniqueness not established, but it cannot be nonlegislatively, because there is not a unique actual world. A central thesis to emerge is then that there are many
actual worlds, among which one may — or may not — be selected as \textit{the} world.\textsuperscript{2} But different choices are defensible. Thus (to cast a theme which holds for very unSchopenhauerian reasons in Schopenhauerian terms), \textit{the} world is a manifestation of will; it involves in principle a \textit{constrained} choice.

Anti-realism, the usual false contrast with realism\textsuperscript{3}, is accordingly not of much present concern (except insofar as radical pluralism erroneously gets accounted anti-realist!). For anti-realisms are characteristically reductionistic; they characteristically take issue, in one way or another, with the prized (transcendental) properties ascribed under the existential claim — mind or human independence especially — if not with the main claim itself. Anti-realisms will of course find a place in the pluralistic framework to be elaborated; but, especially in view of their anthropocentricism,\textsuperscript{4} that place deserves to be a lowly and unimportant one (see further §6).

1. ON THE WORLD AND THEORY STRUCTURE OF RADICAL PLURALISM

Analytic philosophers often have a hard time understanding radical pluralism. Hopefully it will clarify matters to outline at once the doubly pluralistic framework presupposed, which is to be developed and further defended (see Diagram 1).\textsuperscript{5}

Subscripting is adopted to indicate further multiplicity — because there are many variants upon physical realism, many styles and depths of scepticism, many cultures of varying qualities with somewhat different worlds and commonsensical theories, especially if past and future variations are duly recognised, and so on. Radical pluralism both surveys (a level up, if you like) and is part of this richness and comprehensible complexity. Sistological pluralism is \textit{a} radical pluralism (a subscripted type), one based upon a liberal theory of objects. It is, in fact, an enriched commonsense. It is not the only radical pluralism, simply a preferred one, selected here (from which all superficially absolute claims are advanced). Sistological pluralism is a bundle of positions, with classification, ranking and choice of positions within the bundle, coupled with a system of worlds also classified. But it is also a position within the bundle, a chosen position where nonexistent objects have standing, which asserts that there is this bundle of positions, as already indicated.