Lewis raises two problems concerning Aristotle's conception of predication in the central books of the *Metaphysics*. The central problem of the paper is drawn from texts describing two kinds of metaphysical predication, viz., the predication of accidents of concrete individuals and the predication of forms of matter. Lewis then asks whether this notion of predication can accommodate sentences which predicate membership in a kind of concrete individuals. Lewis's discussion of this question suggests several different problems which I propose to separate. The first, which I shall label the metaphysical problem, is whether the acceptance of 'Socrates is a man' as a well-formed sentence involves a commitment to a third type of metaphysical predication, the predication of a species or a form of a concrete individual. The second, which I shall call the linguistic problem, concerns the relationship between linguistic predication and metaphysical predication. Can the metaphysical theory of predication serve as the basis for a linguistic theory of predication?

The second problem which Lewis addresses is the perennial problem of the inconsistent triad; namely, how can forms be substances, if forms are universals and no universal is a substance?

In the first section of this paper, I shall consider the metaphysical and linguistic versions of Lewis's central question. Lewis's treatment of the metaphysical problem seems correct in the main, but more needs to be said about why the sentence, 'Socrates is a man', does not predicate form of Socrates. Although Lewis raises the linguistic question, he does not, so far as I can determine, answer it. My answer is: No. Aristotle's metaphysical theory of predication cannot serve as an adequate foundation for a linguistic theory of predication, nor was it intended to perform this function.

The problem of the inconsistent triad is taken up in the second section. I have dealt with this problem elsewhere, proposing a solution to it which invokes a distinction between a broad conception of a universal and a narrower conception.¹ By contrast, Lewis holds that forms are universal in relation to many portions of matter whereas accidents are universal in relation to many concrete individuals. Lewis's solution turns on a notion of matter that is problematic on textual and conceptual grounds, so he fails to

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offer a solution which is a viable alternative to mine. In the third and fourth sections, I note some further difficulties with Lewis's treatment of matter and with his definitions.

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Lewis is concerned to show that sentences which predicate membership in a kind of substantial individuals are consistent with passages in the *Metaphysics* that describe two ways of being a subject, for instance, 1038b4–6:

[The substratum] underlies in two ways, either being a this, as the animal underlies its affections, or as the matter underlies the actuality.

According to Lewis, this passage and other similar passages (1029a23–24, 1049a27–36) specify the two forms of predication recognized in the central books of the *Metaphysics*. These two forms are summed up in Axiom 1:

A1. $x$ is predicated of $y$ ($y$ is the subject of $x$) only if either $x$ is an accident and $y$ is an individual substance, or $x$ is form and $y$ is a parcel of matter.

Many sentences of ordinary discourse seem to fit the first disjunct of A1, for instance, (1) Socrates is pale; but other sentences do not seem to satisfy either disjunct, for instance, (2) Socrates is a man.

As Lewis points out, sentence (2) is easily dealt with on the theory of metaphysical predication at work in the *Categories*. On that theory, secondary substances are predicated of primary substances; "Socrates" names a primary substance and "man" refers to a secondary substance. Secondary substances do not figure in the description of predication in the *Metaphysics*. Nonetheless, if "man" is a referring expression, as it seems to be for Aristotle, then its referent would be predicated of Socrates in (2). If the referent of "man" is the species, man, then (2) predicates a species of a concrete individual; if the form, then it predicates form of a concrete individual. In either case, the existence of a type of metaphysical predication not mentioned in A1 would be implied. To resolve this difficulty, Lewis must establish both that (i) species is not a basic ontological category for Aristotle and hence the predication of species is not metaphysically basic and (ii) "man" does not refer to the species form in (2).

Lewis draws much of his argument for (i) from Z17. A passage in this chapter which Lewis does not discuss and which offers further support for his conclusion is 1041a32–b2.²

The object of the inquiry is most easily overlooked where one term is not predicated of another, e.g. when we ask "what is man?"

The form of the question draws our attention away from the formal cause.