A vexing problem in Leibniz's philosophy is whether his thesis that bodies are phenomena is compatible with the doctrine that they are aggregates of individual substances. Even in his mature philosophy, Leibniz holds that monads have an organic body in association with them that they dominate. Moreover, the organic body is supposed, in some sense, to be an aggregate of monads, each of which is the dominant monad of another organic body. However the aggregation theory is interpreted, it demands that monads be associated in some fashion with physical bodies—the phenomena represented in inter-monadic representations. But phenomena are perceived according to a relational network. And each monad can be assigned the position of its respective organic body. However, it must be recognized that there is no well-founded answer to the question where in the relational network a monad is located. For Leibniz is adamant that monads cannot have position as such. It is clear that monadic representation, relations, and phenomena are intimately connected in Leibniz's metaphysics. For example, in his letter to Arnauld of October 9, 1687. Leibniz says "that the soul naturally expresses the whole universe in a particular sense and according to the relation that other bodies have to its own..." He goes on to define the term "expresses":

... One thing expresses another (in my terminology) when there is a constant and fixed relation between what can be said of the one and of the other. It is thus that a perspectival projection expresses its ground-plan (G. 2. 112).

Thus, monads represent their respective organic bodies as standing in certain relationships, where 'expressing' is a representation of the monadic states that are these bodies. Leibniz is clearly stating that some determinate correspondence or mapping obtains between monadic representations of the diverse monadic states that pertain to different monads. But how can a correspondence of this sort obtain if there are no true relations among monads? The main task of the present study is to suggest an answer to this question. It will be argued that monads do not bear any non-formal relations to one another, that is relations such as causality, or space understood in a realist sense. But certain second-order relations do obtain, the sort that obtain in monadic representation as relations among organic bodies. Moreover, it will be argued

that it is the notion of a second-order relation (when properly explicated) that underscores Leibniz’s claim that composite things are “... beings by aggregation and therefore phenomena” (G. 2. 252/L. 531).

In the course of the argument, the following issues will be addressed: (1) what are the theoretical inter-connections among Leibniz’s views on monadology, relations, and his doctrine of representation of which monadic perception is a species? and (2) does Leibniz hold that relational accidents are, in some sense, reducible to non-relational ones? If so, what are the consequences for (a) Leibniz’s understanding of the relational properties of every-day individuals like David and Solomon and such composite things as cannons and tanks, and (b) his claim that monads “mirror” the universe from their individual points of view. The latter part of the paper will consider whether Leibniz’s conception of a phenomenalist reduction of the ‘physical world’ involves an explicit doctrine stating that there are different sorts of predicate levels. And if so, what are the criteria that distinguish them? On this score, I shall have something to say about Leibniz’s attack on the labyrinth of the continuum and its connection with his theory of representation.

I. RELATIONS: THE BARE SCAFFOLDING

It is a commonplace that the basic doctrine of Leibniz’s metaphysics is that “There is nothing in things [in rebus] except simple substances, and in them perception and appetite” (G. 2. 270/L. 537). Thus, reality is ultimately characterized by monads alone, together with their perceptions and appetitions. Accordingly, “a monad, like a soul, is a world by itself, having no intercourse of a dependent nature except with God” (G. 2. 436/L. 600). From this, it follows that monadic representation indicates a capacity that is intrinsic to each monadic reality conceived as a separate and discernible thing. It is this fundamental doctrine that the principles of the dissimilarity of the diverse and the identity of indiscernibles express. It should be apparent that the doctrine of monadic autonomy is essential in any consideration of the status of relations in Leibniz’s metaphysics. The doctrine of relations has been widely misunderstood, and its grounding in the monadology has not been properly appreciated. In fact, too much attention has been focused — rather misleadingly — on the issue of the reducibility of relations. Consider the following two, well-known passages on relations:

My judgment about relations is that paternity in David is one thing, sonship in Solomon is another; but that the relationship common to both is merely a mental thing whose