CHAPTER VI

COMPARISONS WITH OTHER TREATMENTS

29. Comparisons: General Perspectives

The three differences (i)-(iii) listed above in sec. 21 between our theory and most other approaches enable us to make certain comparisons here. In historical perspective, it is perhaps not entirely unfair to say that one of the aims of recent treatments of anaphora has been to explain such exceptions to the Langacker-Ross condition that from our perspective are caused by (i)-(iii), especially by (ii)-(iii). One theoretical difference between our theory and some of the other current theories is that, in these competing theories, an attempt is made to account for the exceptions by reference to the syntactical structure of the input sentence $S_0$ of a semantical game. From our perspective, this may be expected to be doubly misleading (a) because some of the exceptions are caused by factors that are essentially semantical, not syntactical, such as the Exclusion Principle; and (b) because the relevant syntactical structure is not that of $S_0$, anyway, but that of some different sentence making its appearance at a later stage of the semantical game that originally started from $S_0$. Furthermore, exclusive reliance on the syntactical structure of $S_0$ will not help us in connection with the problems (c) caused by special ordering principles, either. These problems were discussed in sec. 27 above.

Because of the differences (a)-(c) between our theory and its rivals, a detailed comparison with the competing treatments is difficult. It may nevertheless be helpful to indicate some of the overall differences in explanatory strategy. This will, we hope, also help the reader to appreciate our own explanatory strategy. Since point-by-point comparisons between other treatments and ours are not possible, we propose to follow here roughly the same strategy we used in discussing the Langacker-Ross restraint above. In other words, we shall try to reconstruct a certain competing thesis within our own framework, seeking to preserve the spirit of the competing view. This approach enables us to bring the resources of our own theoretical framework to bear on the pros and cons of the alternatives.
30. Comparisons: Chomsky

One aspect of Chomsky's approach that can be compared with ours can be seen from the following pairs of examples:

(306) I told his wife that John should exercise more.
(307) I told him that John should exercise more.

Here coreference between "his" and "John" is possible in (306), but coreference between "him" and "John" is impossible in (307). The explanation in our approach is that (G. genitive) can be applied before (G. be) in (306). Such an application yields something like

(308) I told Jill that John should exercise more. Jill is his wife.

Coreference is possible in (308) and hence in (306) because (G. name) will be applied to "John" before (G. he) is applied to "his". In contrast, there is no rule that could be applied to "him" in (307) to move it to a clause later than "John".

In Chomsky's approach there is nothing like the possibility of an intervening application of a rule such as (G. genitive) that would change the structure of the sentence in question. All the work has to be done by the labelled tree structure of the input sentence, e.g., (306) or (307). In order to capture the relevant regularities, a linguist representing an alternative approach to ours can try to do two different things. First, he or she can try to refine the general ordering principles in order to reach the proper formulations of observable regularities. Most of the competing theorists do this, usually by means of the idea of c-command, to be discussed in the next section.

Our examples strongly suggest that this alone will not do the trick, and detailed evidence quickly bears this out. For from (306)-(307) we can see that what makes the difference and opens the door to an intervening rule application is not a difference in structure of the kind that is relevant to rule ordering, but the occurrence of a certain kind of NP (in (306), one containing a genitive pronoun) to which a rule can be applied. If such possibilities of rule application are to be discerned from the structure of an input sentence like (306) or (307), attention