The conceptual weapons used by Latin American philosophers against nineteenth-century positivism were drawn from arsenals provided by German and French philosophers. The so-called "founding period" of Latin American philosophy must be identified with the "discovery" and adoption of neo-Hegelianism, vitalism, historicism and some minor "isms" somehow accepted in German and French philosophical circles. Later on, Heideggerianism, phenomenology, neo-Thomism and neo-Marxism were added to the list. This search for new philosophical horizons was valuable in itself as far as it was related to a strict professional concern. But it had little value in the long run. The new philosophical wave was mainly responsible for some of the negative features that, somehow, characterize Latin American philosophical thought: lack of inventiveness, parochialism, disregard for standards of rigor, clarity and criticism, and disregard for logic and science.

Argentina was no exception in this respect, and the origins of philosophical analysis in Argentina may be traced back to the critical stance adopted by some philosophers and philosophically minded scientists in a milieu dominated by the negative effects of some fashionable German and French philosophies.

In what follows I do not intend to present a history of the analytical tradition in Argentina. I only shall point out some aspects of its development and shall highlight some trends of interest, personalities, institutions and periodicals.

1. FIRST STAGE: INCEPTION

The first signals of a certain interest in philosophical analysis may be traced back to the forties, immediately after the second World War. Mario Bunge started a
periodical, Minerva: Revista Continental de Filosofía, which, in spite of a short life (1944-45), was very influential in setting up standards of professionalism. Although Bunge himself regarded the Vienna Circle as a hybrid school, Minerva published some interesting information concerning logical positivism. From 1945 onwards, some members of the Argentine Group of the International Academy of History and Philosophy of Science started discussions of some of the works of Russell and Carnap. Later, in 1952, Vicente Fatone, Julio Rey Pastor, Carlos Prelat, Eberto Fuentes, and Gregorio Klimovsky, among others, attended these meetings. In the same year, Vicente Fatone, Gregorio Klimovsky and Rolando García began a series of meetings to discuss some topics in logic and philosophy of science. It was also in 1952 that the Philosophical Circle of Buenos Aires began its activities. Mario Bunge acted as chairman and was very active in the organization of discussion groups. In 1954, he handed over to the members of the Circle a draft of his book on causality. Enrique Mathov, Hernán Rodríguez, Manuel Sadosky and José Westerkamp belonged to the Circle. In the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of the University of Buenos Aires—traditionally an active philosophical center—Carlos Cossio held a seminar on von Wright's "Essay on Modal Logic." The seminar took place in 1954 and gave the students who attended it the first opportunity to study symbolic logic.

These references are surely very incomplete. Nevertheless, they give an idea of the way in which philosophical analysis was received in Argentina. The negative attitude prevailing in the faculties of philosophy toward philosophical trends which could affect the "theoretical status quo," moved some people to look for new trends of thought which favored a critical attitude and a scientific outlook. It goes without saying that participation in such groups did not mean a positive attitude toward philosophical analysis. Fatone and Cossio, for example, belonged to quite different philosophical traditions. What was important, even in those cases, was the receptive attitude, the interest in discussing with others the new ideas proposed some time before by the Vienna Circle, Bertrand Russell, Tarski, etc.