There is still another interesting aspect connected with the realistic treatment of mathematical by Iamblichus and Proclus. We mentioned several times that they both accepted a tripartition of being. We noticed that Iamblichus connected with this tripartition of being a tripartition of philosophy into theology, mathematics, and physics (cf. above p. 11). We know that these two tripartitions are "Aristotelian", i.e. that they can be found in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Physics*. The tripartition of being is, as a rule, reported by Aristotle as Platonic (*Met.* A 6, 987b14–16; 28–29; *Z* 2,1028b19–21; *K* 1,1059b6–8; but see also *Met.* K 1,1059a38–1059b2; *Phys.* III 5,204a35–204b2 with Ross' note a.l.); the tripartition of theoretical philosophy he professes as his own doctrine.

Now it is obvious that this tripartition of philosophy fits the preserved writings of Aristotle very badly, as was stressed e.g. by Zeller (II/24 [1921] 179–181). It is strange that it should so often be overlooked that it has its roots in what Aristotle reports to have been Plato's tripartition of being (see P. Merlan, "Aristotle's Unmoved Movers", *Traditio* 4 [1946] 1–30, esp. 3–6), and A. Mansion (*Introduction à la Physique Aristotélicienne* [1945] 122–195) summed up the situation by saying that the tripartition of theoretical philosophy into physics, mathematics and theology makes sense only within the framework of Platonism, while it makes hardly any sense in the non-Platonic phase of Aristotle's philosophy*. In what follows some details will be added to his interpretation.

First of all, let us establish the connection between the Aristotelian and the Platonic tripartition.

The two classic passages on the tripartition of speculative knowledge into theology, mathematics, and physics are in *Met.* E 1,1026a6–19 and *K* 7,1064b1–3 (together with *Phys.* II 2,193b22–36; 194b14; cf. *Nic. Eth.* VI 9, 1142a17–18).

It is easy to guess that this tripartition is the outgrowth of

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* Cf. also E. W. Strong, *Procedures and Metaphysics* (1936) 288 n. 38. The whole book is very important for the topic of the present investigation in that it shows the survival of this tripartition down to the 18th century.
what Aristotle reports so often to have been Plato's tripartition of being (οὐσία) into ideas (intelligibles), mathematical, and sensibles. But it is not even necessary to guess; Met. Γ 2, 1004a2 provides the connecting link. There are as many parts of speculative philosophy as there are spheres of being (οὐσίαι), says Aristotle. In this one sentence we have Plato and Aristotle combined.

Thus, the tripartition of speculative philosophy corresponds to three spheres of being, one of which are mathematical interpreted realistically. But Aristotle finally gave up this interpretation. He did so with some hesitation; the words "unclear" and "perhaps" in Met. E 1, 1026a9 and 15 express this hesitation. Met. K 7, 1064a33 denies subsistence to mathematical without hesitation (perhaps only because it is shorter and has less time for niceties). And other parts of the Metaphysics are very outspoken in the non-realistic interpretation of mathematical. Inasmuch as the hesitation seems to have started early it is not surprising to find in Aristotle passages proving that he himself had misgivings about the tripartition which accorded mathematics a place between physics and theology. Thus in Met. Z 11, 1037a14 mathematics seems to be either forgotten or displaced from its position between physics and theology; and in E 1, 1026a19 instead of the order physics — mathematics — theology we find mathematics — physics — theology (see below, p. 76).

Even more interesting is another unique passage. In Phys. II 7, 198a29–31 the three realms of being are described as the theological, the astronomical, and the physical. The theologicals are imperishable and changeless, the astronomicals imperishable and changeable, the physicals perishable and changing. This tripartition is obviously much more in tune with Aristotle's non-realistic interpretation of mathematicals and recommended particularly by his tripartition expressed in Met. Α 1, 1069a30; 6, 1071b3. Here the three realms of being are described as that of the imperishable and unmoved; of the imperishable in motion; and of the perishable in motion, implying a division of philosophy into theology, astronomy, and physics.

It is remarkable how Alexander Aphrodisias faces the text in Met. Γ 2, 1004a2 (In Metaph. p. 250 f. Hayduck) so clearly es-