I

The criticism of the category of substance in terms of its position in the system runs in two interconnected directions. The first leads to a further category which will be free from the preference given to the relatum of substance as opposed to that of accident. It leads to interdependence. The second direction is not categorial in the limited sense of that term; it links the system with the concept of subject. Let us deal with these two directions of Hegel's argument.

The logical precondition for totality to amount to identity, and not merely correlation, is complete symmetry between the relata or parts comprising the totality. To give to the sum total of accidents the same position given to substance requires that the category of mutuality replace the category of substance. The category of mutuality grants equal activity to both relata, removing the preponderance given to one. Mutuality is a reciprocal causality of substances and their accidents conditioning each other. Each relatum is at once active and passive with regard to the other. Since both are thus, any difference between them is removed.\(^1\) Full totality is full reciprocity between the elements of which the totality consists. Thus the category of substance is only a stage on the way to totality. Totality entails repleteness of substance with its accidents. It elevates that repleteness to the position of a complete circle whose elements are mutually, and not one-sidedly, dependent.

A comparison with Kant's table of categories is appropriate at this point. Under categories of relation, Kant has substance, causality and dependence, and finally community as reciprocity between the active

\(^1\) Logik, II, p. 202 (II, p. 204).
and the passive. Yet when he formulates the third Analogy he speaks of all substances insofar as they can be perceived to coexist in space as standing in permanent relation of mutuality or reciprocity toward one another. Kant does not look at mutual action as characterizing a comprehensive totality where all parts are mutually dependent. For him, mutuality holds between substances. It is not the nature of the one substance, nor does it bring about a totality. With regard to Kant we may speak about relations between particular things, while with regard to Hegel we may speak about the structure of the universe. Thus we see Hegel move from the category of mutuality to the dialectical exhibition of the concept or of the Idea.

Well-known passages in the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* refer to both substance and subject, and to the character of the Absolute as determined by them. These statements deserve a historical as well as a systematic analysis.

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The first text reads as follows:

According to my view, which must justify itself by the presentation of the system, everything depends on this, that we comprehend and express the true not as substance but just as much as subject.4

The first point to be noticed is the way Hegel states his program: he does not deny that substance is related to the true, but he suggests that the true be comprehended also as subject. The aspect of substance is retained, but it will be sublated to the aspect of subject.

The second point to be made concerns Hegel's reference to the true and the truth. When he speaks of the true, he is referring to reality or to the Absolute. Why does he employ the terminology of truth? We can assume that this is connected with Hegel's understanding of the concept of truth, which is related to his turning reality, substance, etc., into the concept of subject.

Hegel distinguishes between *Richtigkeit*, which might be rendered into English as correctness, and truth proper. Correctness denotes the

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3 *Kr. d. r. V.*, B p. 106 (Kemp-Smith p. 113).