Chapter II

American Immigration
And the Common Market

One interesting aspect of migrations to the United States in recent years is the so-called "brain-drain" of professional people, mostly from Europe, rising from 11,000 in 1947 to 30,000 in 1966. Britain, Germany and the Netherlands have been the chief losers in these categories. And unfortunately for many developing countries, many of their young people who come to the U.S. for technical training try to remain in the U.S. for good. During the period 1961–1965, 3,000 scientists, engineers and physicians migrated permanently to the United States from Latin American countries.\(^1\)

The natural growth of the U.S. population is substantial, and, according to some observers – given the way in which the techniques of modern industrialism devour mineral and other irreplaceable substances – is already pressing unduly on our natural resources.\(^1\)

There is also the matter of capital requirements. Spengler believes that immigration on the current scale (253,000 at the time he wrote his analysis, 296,700 in 1965) probably depresses the average level of living in the United States because: 1) newcomers absorb capital which would otherwise be available to lift the productivity of the resident population, and 2) they somewhat increase the pressure on scares natural resources.

On the basis of some of D.C. MacGregor's Canadian data,


Spengler concludes that the addition of one person to our population eventually requires some $12,000 of capital. At present, he figures that it requires about $35 billions of new capital a year to maintain the current natural rate of population growth plus $4 billions annually to meet the capital requirements attributable to our net immigration.

There arises, therefore, the question (in an era of population explosion) can the contribution of emigration to the relief of population pressure be anything but vanishingly small? Even a large multiple of the recent average volume of immigration into the U.S. would by itself contribute very little. And even such a minor contribution to the overpopulated countries would involve a “frightful” cost to the U.S.

For example, the authors of a British study in 1955 agreed that if the U.S. were to undertake the “impossible task” of admitting one-fifth of the overpopulated world’s annually increasing population for ten years, the global problem would largely remain, while in the U.S. “such a tidal wave would result in chaos for both resident and newcomer alike.”

The overpopulated countries, instead of relying primarily on emigration, might be better advised to encourage more foreign capital to industrialize, make better use of native human, material and technical resources, encourage greater domestic savings, and family limitation.

Consider the case of Italy. The Italian south, according to a 1957 report by Ambassador Caffery to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is “characterized by the poverty and inadequate exploitation of resources, a surplus of unskilled labor, and a rigid and archaic social system. Following American leasership, the Italian Government for the first time launched a basic attack on this problem.”

Since 1960 Italy has made encouraging progress, experiencing a high growth rate, with unemployment a smaller fraction of the labor force than in decades.

Some Italian scholars not only shared Caffery’s general assessment, but even more pointedly emphasized that Italy has hardly begun to tackle problems of low productivity and low

---

3 Foreign Aid Program, Compilation of Studies and Surveys for the Special Senate Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, Washington, July, 1957, p. 1314.