Contemporary continental philosophy has moved away from phenomenology, especially Husserlian phenomenology with its transcendental subject. Currents in contemporary theory that have been called "post-structural" and "postmodern" share the rejection of the Husserlian theory of subjectivity. "Post-structuralism" and "postmodernism" are also post-phenomenological. Levinas, Derrida, Lyotard and Kristeva, for example, criticize Husserl's conception of the subject. Of course, Husserl's immediate successors, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty also rejected his conception of the transcendental subject. Returning to different versions of Hegel's dialectical conception of subjectivity, some contemporary theorists challenge the Husserlian notion of a unified transcendental subject by insisting that the subject is not only fragmented or decentered and embodied, but also that it is the result, even the effect, of relationships to something or someone other than itself.

Coming under the direct and indirect influence of Emmanuel Levinas, much contemporary Continental philosophy attempts to come to terms with the "other." Discussions have moved away from a philosophy of subjectivity towards a philosophy of alterity. But, if we look back through the phenomenological tradition, we can already read a dehiscence in the notion of the subject in Husserl, through Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre, that sets up post-phenomenological theories of subjectivity as fundamentally intersubjective. From the beginnings of phenomenology, the other has been at the core of the self. In this essay, I return to Husserl's notion of intersubjectivity to point out how even his transcendental subject is dependent both upon its embodiment and upon its relationship to something other than itself. Within Husserl's philosophy, there is already a split within the subject whereby the very act of conscious ownership necessitates the activity of disowning. I trace the development of this split within subjectivity, this disowning at the heart of owning, through Heidegger's phenomenological ontology which rejects the metaphysics of subjectivity. At the heart of Heidegger's notion of ownness or the proper (Eigen), I find the necessary activity of disowning or impropriety. I analyze the importance of intersubjectivity for Heidegger's notion.
of authenticity (*Eigenlichkeit*) or ownness. I move to Merleau-Ponty and discover not only the embodiment of the Husserlian subject but also the suggestion of a dissolution of borders between the self and the other to the point where one person can almost experience the other as he or she experiences him or herself. Next I take up Sartre’s notion that the ego is the product of the look of the other, who cannot be reduced to an object even though it is still a corollary of intentionality. Finally, I read this history of phenomenology through the contemporary phenomenology of Levinas in order to offer a reading of the trajectory of otherness and intersubjectivity within the phenomenological tradition. By so doing, I situate Levinas *vis a vis* the phenomenological tradition and I provide a way of reading one of Levinas’ most troubling notions in *Otherwise Than Being*, the notion of responsibility.

**HUSSERL**

Although there are three volumes in the *Husserliana* entitled *On the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity* (*Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*), Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity is best known from his discussion in the fifth Meditation of the *Cartesian Meditations*. There, Husserl founds his theory of intersubjectivity on the ownness of consciousness. He maintains that ownness is the eidetic structure of consciousness (*E.M.* 93). What I do not experience as part of my primordial ownness – what I can image as other than myself – is other or alien. The other is constituted through my relation with the ownness of my consciousness and the connection between that ownness and my body. Husserl describes the other as a mirror of my ownness, an analog of me, my alter ego (*CM* 94). The other’s subjectivity or consciousness cannot be directly perceived or presented to me, so it is apperceived or appresented. It is only indirectly perceived or presented as an analog of my own consciousness.

While the other is known through analogy, Husserl insists that the process of constitution is not one of analogical reasoning, but of analogical transfer (*CM* 111). Upon perceiving the body of another we immediately transfer the sense of an animated organism with its own subjectivity onto that perception. The perception of the other is constituted as a perception of an animate conscious organism. And, although the other is my alter ego or my analog, Husserl maintains that I do not apperceive the other as a duplicate of myself; rather, the process is a type of