Husserl's "Ideas II," published at the same time as the present volume, were discussed at length in the previous chapter. There the reasons why Husserl in 1913 published only the first volume of his work were explained and a brief survey of the history of his manuscripts forming the content of "Ideas II" was given. The present volume, briefly entitled "Ideas III," is based upon a manuscript of 1912, drafted at the same time as "Ideas I," and, unlike the manuscripts forming volume II, was never rewritten by the author or his assistants. It is, therefore, more unified than its twin volume on which Husserl worked with interruptions until 1928, but it represents an earlier phase of the development of the thought of the founder of modern phenomenology which cannot always be reconciled with the statements of volume II, let alone the later phases of phenomenological philosophy. Some readers who are familiar with volume I might find it helpful to study Ideas III first before turning to the more complicated and highly elaborated problems presented in Ideas II.

Husserl starts in the first chapter with an investigation of the various realms of reality – the material thing, the animated body, the psyche – in order to ascertain the fundamental kinds of apperception corresponding to each of these realms and the character of the various sciences originating therein. Material things are originally given in acts of material perception, that is, of things in the outer world. Material perceptions in this sense are just a special case of perceptions of extended objects;

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1 Edited by Marly Biemel and published as Volume V. of Husserliana by the Husserl Archiv, Louvain, under the direction of Professor H. L. Van Breda, Den Haag, 1952.
the latter would also include the perception of phantoms. That which distinguishes real material things from phantoms is not, however, their being a "substance" in the sense of Descartes or Spinoza. Their reality, according to Husserl, is principally relative, namely relative to the circumstances by which they are causally determined. In perception the real thing is only given unilaterally, its causal relations remain undetermined. The objectivity of Nature is constituted only in the unified spatial-temporal causal context of the experiences of a plurality of Egos which enter into intercommunication, through the intermediary of their bodies. When one passes to the theoretical attitude, a science of material Nature becomes possible. It follows that all sciences of reality (in the sense just explained) must be causally explanatory if they aim at determining what reality is.

A second basic form of apprehension is that referring to the animated body, not as a material thing but as the carrier of sensorial fields localized therein, as a universe of sensations of sensorial impressions, briefly, as an object characterized by the fact that all perceived bodily experiences are experienced with their localization. The science of somatology (which, of course, presupposes the material experiences of material existence) has to study the somatic perceptions which any scientist makes not only by the experience of his own body, but also by the experiencing apperceptions of the Other's body given to him by way of presentation in the form of empathy. This concept of somatology as a theory of sensations, (treated customarily by physiology and psychology) presupposes the elimination of the sensations from the texture of apprehensions in which they are interwoven. Just the same sensations which in the realizing apprehension of material perceptions function as "presenting contents" (darstellende Inhalte) for material characteristics, receive localization in the new realizing apprehension which we call "our bodily experiences," namely as states of sensation; yet they are under the heading "perceptual states of the I" components of the psychical state, thus belonging to the third realm of reality, that of the psyche or of the egological sphere. That is the true reason why psychology, understood as the science of the psyche, has also to deal with sensations. But whereas from the point of view of somatology the sensations are manifestations