Husserl suggested that I review the *Méditations Cartésiennes* for some American periodical. I said that I had thought of writing an exposition of the *Fifth Meditation*, as the narrower subject would have the advantage of allowing greater detail. Even so it seemed to me, I said, that such points as the nature of the *Paarung* (pairing) which is at the basis of our experience of other minds should be elucidated in such an account, and such an elucidation would involve an exposition of the general nature of passive association.

This launched Husserl on an exposition of the nature of association, and of passivity in general. Every active comparison of two objects presupposes a passive association of the two. In the activity of following this association I may become aware of similarity and difference. I asked whether one were to understand the difference between activity and passivity as an absolute or relative difference, and in trying to make myself clear I spoke of the intensity of activity. Husserl said that there were such variations of activity as are indicated by the phrase *striving*, but that one ought to be very careful in determining the place of striving in relation to activity in general.

The difference between activity and passivity is present on the level of perception. I am affected by certain things, they stimulate me, and I answer them with an active attention. Before that the objects are given as on the border (horizontmässig) of the active perceptive field. When I attend them, I am aware of them (when I actively attend them) as having been “there” before my attending.

The horizon admits of further detailed description. There are many objects as it were “seeking my ear” but only one at a time gains it.

Not all horizontmässige objectivity is wahrnehmungshorizontmässig (on a perceptual border or horizon). There are inner and outer horizons. The non-given aspects of objects, even of wahrnehmungs-horizontmässige objects, are likewise “there” in passivity awaiting my active attention.
Whenever I indulge in an Auslegung (explication) of a perceived object I am active, and there arise various modes of Abgehobenheit (salience, contrast) corresponding to the nature of my Beschäftigung (occupation, being busied with) with the (passively constituted) object. When, for example, I turn to contemplation of a certain aspect of a perceived object, the totality of that object is still an object of active attention, but is modalized as "noch im Griff behalten" (still-keeping-in-one's-grip). Again, if I turn from one aspect of an object to another, the first aspect remains an object of an active act, but in certain modalization. The object too is given as already in one aspect known.

He also spoke of the temporal horizon, and of the loss of Anschaulichkeit (intuitiveness) which every moment suffers as it sinks in retention. There can be a similar loss of Anschaulichkeit in the case of a Wiedererinnerung (recollection). In these cases we may speak of Klarheit (clarity), while the object remains as deutlich (distinct, plain) as ever: the structure remains evident though the content becomes "empty". There can, however, be a Weckung (awakening) from an actively attended phase of the remembered object to a previously peripheral phase, say, to a phase which, even when the object was in a lebendige Gegenwart (living present) was never other than peripheral, was never the object of an active perception.

Active remembering is conditioned as a Weckung that goes from a present Interesse (interest) out toward a past similar object, already passively associated. Normally attention is directed to the lebendige Gegenwart, and, within the latter, to the Urquellpunkt (primal-source point), but it may be "called" to past passively associated contents, either those that are retentional leer (empty), or those that are retentional anschaulich (intuitive).

I asked if it were not so that even every peripheral object, so far as it is a determinate object, "weist auf eine solche aktive Auslegung" of which the object is the Sedimentierung (sedimentation). Husserl agreed that this was so, but pointed out that not on every level of passivity was one to find objects or Objektschichten (strata of objects) as the results of activity.

I asked specifically whether one could find an activity in the