Husserl characterized Heidegger's Aristotle interpretation as a reading back into Aristotle of an attempt to answer a question which first arose in Husserl's philosophy.

I forgot above to mention an all-important widening of the meaning of kinaesthesis. Husserl spoke of the free possibility of "turning to" an object in memory as involving kinaesthesia.

Pursuing the strain indicated by the idea of potentiality, I asked him whether feelings connected with the beating of the heart or the processes of digestion were kinaesthesia in the same sense as the feelings connected with hand or eye movements, and as the kinaesthesia involved in memory. He replied that an express act of volition was by no means necessarily involved when there is a connection between kinaesthetic and sensational data. The idea of kinaesthesia expresses primarily a functional connection. Thus the essential distinction between sense data and kinaesthetic data remains unclear for me.

VI

Notes on conversation with Husserl, 18/7/31

I began by stating that I was not clear about the nature of kinaesthesia, and this started Husserl on an analysis of perception, much of which was familiar. To the perception of a physical object there is necessary not only the constitution of a certain Einstimmigkeit <harmony, accord, accordance, agreement> in the Verlauf <course, flow> of Empfindungen <sensations>, but also a correlated kinaesthetic structure. Along with the sphere of ursprünglicher Passivität <originary, primitive passivity> there is not only a sphere of Aktivität <activity> but also a sphere of secondary Passivität <passivity>. The latter term indicates what necessarily follows of itself once we have actively brought about a certain situation. E. g., once I have turned toward perceiving an object a certain sort of Verlauf findet notwendig statt <course (or flow) necessarily occurs>. Really it is a Wesenzusammenhang <essential interconnection>.

The sphere of activity is one of freedom and inhibition – the sphere where there is some sense in saying I can or I can’t.
Activity goes out from a certain passivity, a certain given. This is true in the case of memory. I try to remember a name. *Ich beschäftige mich mit den Namen und doch vermag ich nicht es zu erinnern*\(^9\). When the process goes further toward its goal, there is a *Hemmung* (inhibition).

The perception of an object involves the presence of a body as organism. Only because I am as body a thing in the world, may I have a world.

These analyses, or something connected with this general problem, Husserl wanted to give as *Beilage II* (supplement II) (Really as *Beilage I*) to the *Logische Untersuchungen* but he saw that the analysis of kinaesthesia was insufficient and accordingly he suppressed the *Beilage*. The other *Beilage* had already been printed, and hence it stands as "*Beilage I*" though there is in fact no further *Beilage*. (In fact it has no number. Husserl got things a bit twisted here. Really the thing that had already been printed — and that stands in the 2d edn. as a footnote (II, p. 364) — [was] referring to "*Beilage 2*".\(^{10}\)

The constitution of my body for me is by virtue of the fact that each "organ" is in one or more ways *object* of another organ.

In the case of the *kinaesthesia* of touch (not the *Empfindungen* (sensations)) we have the 2-dimensional kinaesthetic field *localized* on the surface of the body. But the two are not identical. When I move the body, the surface is deformed but the field of kinaesthesia is not. Indeed, it has no sense to speak of the kinaesthetic field being deformed.

The eye does not see the eye, and the relation of the visual kinaesthetic field to the eye as physical object is therefore different.

There is no generic similarity between kinaesthetic data and sensations. The latter — all of them, but in different degrees and ways according to the field to which they belong — are capable of mediating the perception of an object. The kinaesthetic data are not.

But kinaesthetic data form among themselves various systems which in turn are interrelated and form a unity. With each system

\(^9\) "I occupy myself with the names and, yet, I cannot recall them".

\(^{10}\) *Logische Untersuchungen*, 2nd volume, 1st part, p. 364 (2nd ed.).