He said nothing gave the evidence of phenomenology like actual work on a special problem. His prize Schrift (work) saved Fink, because it set him to work intensively on the problem of Neutralitätsmodification (neutrality modification).

Becoming historically conscious of its tradition is not adequate to the salvation of present-day culture, because in history that tradition is not itself conscious of its own meaning.

He spoke of his own inclination, always to inquire where things were most distressing and uncertain, as important in determining the nature of his discoveries.

IX

_Conversation with Fink, 17/8/31_

I began by asking him what Husserl had meant at the end of my last visit when he suggested that I ask him questions concerning the phenomenological reduction, and he added that he had become aware since the publication of the _Ideen_ of many difficulties in the reduction. To which Fink:

The phenomenological reduction is no longer regarded by Husserl as merely a step which frees the transcendental field for investigation. Its significance as making possible a naive sort of act-analysis, such as one has in the _Ideen_, remains; but phenomenological investigation cannot, after the phenomenological reduction, proceed as if in a homogeneous field, but must continually exercise further reductions such as those involved in the problems of "genesis". The phenomenological field is not "there" at all, but must first be created. Thus the phenomenological reduction is creative, but of something which bears a necessary relation to that which is "there".

The phenomenological reduction has frequently, even at first by Husserl himself, been confused with certain epochés which may be exercised in the natural attitude. An example which Husserl earlier used to illustrate the phenomenological reduction

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23 Vergegenwärtigung und Bild (see note 5, p. 2), which received a prize in an academic contest in 1929, before being submitted and accepted as a doctoral dissertation.
but which he now uses to illustrate a differential character of an epoche in the natural attitude, is as follows:

Two persons having a difference of opinion agree to "suspend judgment" until they can appeal to the facts. Each however retains his own opinion, not only as a content, but also as an opinion; he "suspend judgment" only in the sense that he no longer makes use of his opinion, pending verification. This epoche is not phenomenological reduction, since the real (world-) background of the opinion remains posited by the persons in our illustration. The epoche concerns a detail of the natural world, whereas the phenomenological epoche concerns the entirety of existence.

But it is important to see that the phenomenological reduction does not involve a suspension of thetic activity. This characteristic it has in common with the above-described "suspension" of judgment. The naïve setting of the world still goes on. The epoche is one exercised by the ego, not as directly living its intentionalities, but as reflecting on them. As phenomenologically reflecting upon itself and its acts, the ego does not participate in the doxic element involved in its acts.

Thus one has a doubling of the ego in the phenomenological attitude: the simple, "believing" ego is distinguished from the reflective ego which exercises the phenomenological epoche. Still the "two" egos are essentially identical, and this distinction within the ego becomes a phenomenological problem. A necessary step in its elucidation is the analysis of the doubling of the ego that takes place when, in the natural attitude, one reflects on and exercises epoche concerning an act. In this case it is the psychic ego which reflects, since it continues to execute the thesis of the world in general, and continues to regard itself as in the world.

The consideration that the phenomenological reduction does not inhibit the naïve thesis keeps us from erroneously supposing that analyses in the phenomenological attitude are analyses of pseudo-acts and a pseudo-world. It should make it easier to understand what the phenomenological reduction is with respect to non-doxic acts, such as decisions. In such cases it would seem that any direct epoche would inhibit all there was of the act, or change it essentially. An epoche in reflection, however, lets the act proceed as it naturally does.

Having once carried out the phenomenological reduction, one