Coercion and authority are two radically different forms of social power. This has not always been noticed. Dennis Wrong, for example, makes coercion a sub-type of authority (Wrong, 1979, p. 24). To make sense of my present project, we need to identify some relevant social structures and institutions, namely, those which are deterrent or coercive in nature and those whose authority is guaranteed by a legitimate state. I do not want to get entangled in the methodological question of what kind of things social structures and state-institutions are (Manicas, 1980). I just presuppose that some coercive institutions exist and that they are designed to make us obey the law and observe the obligations created by the social order. Such institutions present genuine threats to citizens and also realize them, if necessary. I presuppose further that the social order is at least reasonably just. This may be taken to imply that we are studying a minimal type of coercion, and perhaps authority too. Some examples of our objects of interest are the army, police, customs and intelligence service.

II

Let us start by studying the two senses of the concept of coercion. We suppose that

\[ A \text{ coerces } B \text{ to do } x. \]

More fully, this is to say that

\[ A \text{ coerces } B \text{ to do } x \text{ by threatening to bring about } y. \]

The relevant utilities in this situation are expressed by the following set of formulas, CO:
It would then be possible to elucidate the meaning of 'coercion' along the lines adopted by, say, Robert Nozick and Michael D. Bayles. Except at one point that will not interest us very much (Nozick, 1972; Bayles, 1972).

We call the idea specified by CO the strict concept of coercion and interpret it as follows: (1) means that B always loses something, and therefore his basic rational motive is to avoid the situation. (2) means that to follow A's instructions toward x is better than to let A realize the threat, y. (3) means that A prefers not to realize his threat. This is a rather complex condition: What is implied is that A would rather not realize his threat, but he is still fully committed to it. Thus B is supposed to know that resistance and only resistance makes A realize the threat. A good discussion is F. C. Schelling (1981), *The Strategy of Conflict*, Ch. I. (4) means that A will get a positive net gain when B follows his orders. For example, police officer A tells suspect B that if B does not surrender and let himself be arrested, he is going to shoot him. It is easy to see that the conditions (1)–(4) of CO are satisfied.

Next, we shall get the idea of deterrence out of the strict concept of coercion in the following simple way: we write

\[(4') \quad u_A(x) = 0\]

and keep CO otherwise as it is. We call this modified CO DE. My point is that officer A deters convict B's possible escape, after arresting him, by keeping his gun available all the time. Officer A cannot gain anything positive in the situation, although B's escape would be a considerable loss to him. To repeat, A does not want anything like a positive increase of utility from B. B is now only supposed to omit his best possible action-alternative, which is naturally to escape. Thus deterrence is different from strict coercion where B is supposed to do something which will profit A.

Let us call the strict concept of coercion and deterrence together coercion. One source of possible problems concerning this complex notion should now be taken care of. I mean that strict coercion is an event that always implies