A long tradition in philosophy holds that true belief is not equivalent to knowledge. Some philosophers have maintained one half of the equivalence, that knowledge entails true belief. (For example, see Chisholm [3], p. 16 and Ayer [2], p. 34.) The converse, that true belief entails knowledge, has been rejected by and large. In this paper, I shall investigate the connection between knowledge and true belief in the system of epistemic logic developed by Jaakko Hintikka in his book *Knowledge and Belief* [4]. Specifically, I will show that if knowledge and true belief are considered in isolation from each other, then, in two important cases, there is no difference between the logics of the two notions. I also show how, in these same cases, differences between the logic of knowledge and the logic of true belief emerge, when the two notions are considered together.

Hintikka claims that the logic presented in *Knowledge and Belief* suggests an answer to the question, “How do knowledge and true belief differ?” According to him, knowledge and true belief have different logics. (Hintikka [5], pp. 82–83.) Where then is the difference between the logics of knowledge and true belief reflected in Hintikka’s epistemic logic? In *Knowledge and Belief*, he suggests that the difference is reflected in the difference between the version of the epistemic operator governed by the condition A.PKK* and a version governed only by the weaker condition A.PK*. The condition A.PKK* states that if a set $\mathcal{X}$ is defensible and $K_aP_1 \in \mathcal{X}, K_aP_2 \in \mathcal{X}, \ldots, K_aP_n \in \mathcal{X}, P_\neg a \in \mathcal{X}$, then the set $\{K_aP_1, K_aP_2, \ldots, K_aP_n, q\}$ is defensible. On the same condition, the rule A.PK* only requires that the set $\{P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n, q\}$ be defensible. According to Hintikka, the verb ‘to know’ in its most typical sense obeys A.PKK*.1 (Hintikka [4], p. 19). So the logic of knowledge may be represented by the logic of the strong operator governed by A.PKK*. But, Hintikka notes, the verb ‘to know’ is sometimes used in such a way that it means something
like 'is aware' or 'rightly believes'. The logic of this sense of knowledge (i.e., true belief) is represented by the weak epistemic operator governed by $A.PK^*$. (Hintikka [4], pp. 18–19.)

The claim that Hintikka locates the difference between knowledge and true belief in the way just outlined is reinforced by remarks in his paper ‘The Modes of Modality’. (Hintikka [5], pp. 71–86.) In it, he says that the logic of knowledge and the logic of true belief are different and that the difference is reflected formally in the difference between an epistemic operator governed by $C.M & NN^+$, a condition analogous to $A.PKK^*$, and an operator governed by $C.M & N^+$, a weaker condition analogous to $A.PK^*$. Hintikka says that when we are dealing with genuine knowledge, and not just true opinion, the condition $C.M & NN^+$ must be fulfilled. On the other hand, mere true opinion does not obey $C.M & NN^+$, but only the weaker $C.M & N^+$. (Hintikka [5], pp. 83–84. These claims are further reinforced by Hintikka [5], p. 10 and Hintikka [6], p. 144.)

Yet, on Hintikka's own grounds, one would expect to find the differences between knowledge and true belief reflected in other features of his epistemic logic as well. This expectation is evoked by his methodological remarks in ‘Epistemic Logic and the Methods of Philosophical Analysis’ (Hintikka [5], pp. 3–19) taken in conjunction with his views about the adequacy of the epistemic logic that he presents.

In ‘Epistemic Logic and the Methods of Philosophical Analysis’, Hintikka suggests that the meaning which an expression has in a formal logic should be regarded as a basic meaning of that expression. If the basic meaning selected is 'an appropriate one', then, given an understanding of the pragmatic features involved in a particular situation, it should be possible to explain how the expression is used in ordinary language. (Hintikka [5], pp. 6–7.) Such explanations are clearly very important in the theoretical study of natural language.

The basic meanings of the verb 'to know' incorporated in Hintikka's logic, for example, are the strong and weak versions of the epistemic operator. The basic meanings of 'to believe' are the strong and weak versions of the doxastic operator.

Hintikka claims that the results of his epistemic logic agree by and large with the way in which the verbs 'to know' and 'to believe' are naturally used. (Hintikka [4], p. 10.) Moreover, he feels that there are