Contemporary philosophers frequently claim that the truth-conditions of modal claims involve necessarily existing abstract entities, be they states of affairs, propositions, attributes or possible worlds.\footnote{1} Thus Platonism, or belief in a realm of necessary abstract entities, is currently a popular philosophical stance. Many Platonist philosophers hold no brief for theism. There even appears to be a conflict between traditional theism and a Platonist ontology. Traditional theism holds that God is the creator of everything distinct from Himself, so that whatever is distinct from God depends on God for its existence. Necessary beings seem not to depend on God for their existence. If something exists necessarily, we want to say, it exists simply because it is its nature to exist, just as God, according to Descartes’ ontological argument, exists because it is His nature to exist. If necessary abstract entities do not depend on God for their existence, then by positing these, contemporary Platonism contradicts the traditional theistic claim that whatever is distinct from God does depend on God for its existence.

There is a passage in Leibniz’ *Monadology* which appears highly surprising against this backdrop, for in it Leibniz seems to argue that far from being incompatible with theism, Platonism entails theism. In sections 43—44 of that work, Leibniz contends that

If there is a reality in essences or possibilities, or indeed in eternal truths, this reality must be founded on something existent and actual, and consequently on the existence of the necessary being in whom essence involves existence, or in whom to be possible is itself to be actual . . . without (God) there would be nothing real in the possibilities — not only nothing existent, but also nothing possible.\footnote{2}

Leibniz calls this argument a proof of the existence of God “by the reality of eternal truths”\footnote{3}. He adds that

whereas necessary truths depend solely on His understanding, of which they are the internal object.\textsuperscript{4}

The surprise in Leibniz' thinking is this. Leibniz' "eternal truths" are genuinely necessary, in the most full-blooded sense, and their truth-conditions involve the similarly necessary existence of certain abstract entities. As we have noted, it seems that genuinely necessary beings are not caused to exist; similarly, it seems that necessary truths are not caused to be true. Yet Leibniz is so sure that necessary truths must be caused to be true and necessary beings must be caused to exist that he bases an argument for God's existence on this conviction.

Robert M. Adams has recently offered a reading of what Leibniz might have in mind:

Possibilities and necessary truths are discovered, not made (and yet) possibilities and necessary truths cannot be there except insofar as they or the ideas involved in them are thought by some mind. The first (thesis) seems to require Platonism; the second is a repudiation of it. Yet they can both be held together if we suppose that there is a non-human mind that . . . necessarily exists and thinks all the possibilities and necessary truths.\textsuperscript{5}

According to Adams, then, Leibniz denies that non-divine necessary beings exist by their very natures. Rather, these exist necessarily because God necessarily exists and necessarily creates them; they are thoughts which God thinks (and so creates) in all possible worlds.

Even if Adams does capture Leibniz' thinking, he does not put together a deductive argument for the existence of God from the existence of necessary abstract entities or necessary truths. I would like to try to do just this. I will not claim that the argument I offer is exactly what Leibniz had in mind. I do however claim that the argument comports well with Leibniz' text and is of enough intrinsic philosophical interest to be worth considering. I must stress that the argument I offer will be strictly within the framework of a Platonist ontology. It depends on one or two metaphysical assumptions which only a Platonist will accept, and its conclusion will be only that a Platonist ontology commits one to the existence of a being with at least some attributes a Platonist would ascribe to God. I begin by arguing that possibly, necessary abstracta are caused to exist — the Causability Thesis, or CT.