An ongoing major concern in the philosophy of language is the formulation of an adequate semantic account of propositional attitude ascriptions. Its primary aim would be to describe the semantic contribution that a content-sentence makes in the determination of the truth-conditions of any ascriptional sentence in which it is embedded. In the present paper, I shall examine a particular account that has gained general acceptance among those who defend a Representationalist account of propositional attitudes. According to the view in question, an embedded content-sentence functions as part of an implicit sortal predicate, one that applies to all and only linguistic tokens that are, in some yet-to-be-defined sense, of the same sort as the content-sentence itself. On its behalf, Representationalists have often argued that this view provides an adequate, if not the best, explanation of the semantically opaque features of indirect psychological discourse. Roughly put, indirect psychological contexts are on this account fundamentally quotational contexts, and thus, lack the familiar trademarks of extensionality, such as the substitutivity of co-referential terms, *salva veritate*, and existential generalization.

I contend, however, that the Representationalist's account is inherently flawed. It succumbs to a version of Alonzo Church's *Translation Argument*. To make this criticism stick, I need to show two things. First, it must be established that the Representationalist's quotational description of psychological oblique contexts is open to such an objection, since it may not be obvious that it is. Second, it must be shown that the version of Church's objection that I advance below does work since there may be some who are skeptical of any version. The discussion of these issues will take up the second part of this paper. The first part is a brief but detailed exposition of the Representationalist's account, to which I shall now turn.

A. The Exemplar Account

Consider the sentence,

(1) Smith believes that Marilyn Monroe was a movie star.

According to William G. Lycan, an ardent Representationalist, the sentential complement of (1) serves "as a sort of exemplar or sample of what is said to be believed". The idea is a familiar one. By virtue of simultaneously instantiating a certain type of property and functioning as a symbol that refers to that property, the sentential complement of a belief-ascription in effect refers, in an indirect and nondenotational manner, to the extension of that property. For purposes of discussion, I shall refer to this view as the "Exemplar Account" of psychological oblique contexts.

Borrowing from Catherine Z. Elgin’s recent work, I shall characterize the Exemplar Account, as it applies to belief-ascriptions, along the following lines. For any belief-sentence of the form,

(B) J believes that P

the sentence that replaces "P" in the above schema, which we shall hereafter dub as "Q" and which thereby forms the sentential complement of the belief-sentence, will be a ⟨⟨Q⟩⟩-sentence. Thus, the sentential complement of (1) is a ⟨⟨Marilyn Monroe was a movie star⟩⟩-sentence, and an English one at that. The expression, "⟨⟨Marilyn Monroe was a movie star⟩⟩", functions as a common noun and the pair of matching double corner quotes serves to both form the said common noun and to demonstrate the sentence it encloses. By doing so, the demonstrated sentence serves as an exemplar in (1). Seen in this manner, that means that the expression, "x is a ⟨⟨Marilyn Monroe was a movie star⟩⟩-sentence", picks out a class of linguistic tokens, namely, those that are of the same type as the demonstrated sentence.

Of course, what determines the extension of a predicate of the form "x is a ⟨⟨Q⟩⟩-sentence", where "Q" is to be replaced by a sentence, is open to debate. For instance, with respect to the above example, some