ABSTRACT. A somewhat simplified version of Jerrold J. Katz's theory of the analytic/synthetic distinction for natural languages is presented. Katz's account is criticized on the following grounds. (1) the 'antonymy operator' is not well defined; it leaves certain sentences without readings. (2) The account of negation is defective; it has the consequence that certain nonsynonymous sentences are marked as synonymous. (3) The account of entailment is defective; it has the consequence that analytic sentences entail synthetic ones. (4) Katz's account of "indeterminable sentences" is criticized; it has the consequence that certain logical truths are not marked as analytic. (5) Katz's semantics provides no account of truth, so that he is unable to show that analytic sentences are true and that 'indeterminable' sentences are not.

In his book, *The Philosophy of Language*, 1 Jerrold Katz attempts to provide an account of the analytic/synthetic distinction for natural languages. He offers a solution to what, in his first paper on this topic, he calls "Quine's Problem". I shall present enough of the Katz-Fodor semantic theory to explain Katz's account of the analytic/synthetic distinction. I shall then present a critical analysis and evaluation of this portion of Katz's book. Full details of the Katz-Fodor semantic theory will not be presented; instead a simplified version will be offered. But none of the simplifications will be relevant to the points of criticism which will subsequently be made.

The chief technical concept employed by Katz is that of the semantic marker. It is the analogue in semantics of such syntactic categories as 'Adjective', 'Noun Phrase', 'Verb', and these latter are called syntactic markers. The dictionary component of semantic theory will list not only syntactic markers in its lexical entries for words (or morphemes) but also semantic markers such as '(Male)', '(Human)', '(Animate)'. Some semantic markers are complex such as '((Male) ∨ (Female))'. These are all expressed as "Boolean functions" of simple semantic markers. Some words (or morphemes) have identical dictionary entries except for a difference in semantic markers. For example, the entry for 'woman' is identical with the entry for 'man' except that one entry has the marker '(Female)' where the other has '(Male)'. The second sub-component, beside the
lexicon, of the semantic component of the linguistic description of a 
language is the projection rule sub-component.

Katz says "A dictionary entry consists of a set of lexical readings 
associated with a phonological representation of a morpheme and a set 
of syntactic markers. These syntactic markers provide the information 
necessary to determine whether the lexical reading associated with a 
morpheme $M$ is to be assigned to an occurrence of $M$ in an underlying 
phrase marker. We proposed that the assignment take place just in case 
the syntactic categorization of $M$ in the underlying phrase marker ascribes 
to $M$ exactly those syntactic markers that appear in the set of syntactic 
markers in the entry for $M$. The determination of whether or not such 
a condition is satisfied in the case of any particular phrase marker is 
made on the basis of the purely formal operation of checking to determine 
if each symbol in the set of syntactic markers for the lexical item $M$ has 
a formally identical counterpart among those symbols that label nodes 
dominating the occurrence of the item in the phrase marker." The opera-
tion described in the last sentence is the work of one of Katz's projection 
rules called "Rule (I)" (p. 163).

Once Rule I has assigned all of the admissible readings which the ter-
minaI elements in the underlying phrase marker of a sentence may take the 
other projection rules operate to assign 'derived readings' to each of the 
increasingly larger constituents of the sentence in question. Taking as 
input from the syntactic component abstract representations for each of 
the well formed sentences of the language (together with their underlying 
phrase markers), the semantic component of the linguistic description will, 
in the manner indicated, assign a semantic interpretation (set of readings) 
to every sentence in the language. Other semantic concepts and relations 
are defined in terms of the notion of a reading. A sentence is synonymous 
with another sentence if, and only if, they have the same readings. 
A sentence is ambiguous if, and only if, it has more than one read-
ing etc.

The notion of analyticity which Katz attempts to reconstruct is the 
Kantian one. We will confine our account (again for simplicity) to syn-
tactically noncompound copula sentences of the Subject + Predicate type. 
Katz is able to replace Kant's vague appeal to grammar by exact defini-
tions of the relevant syntactic relations. The grammatical relation 'subject 
of the sentence $S$' is defined as follows: "The string of words $\sigma$ is the