ABSTRACT. Recent epistemology divides theories of knowledge according to their diagnoses of cases of "failed knowledge", Gettier cases. Two rival camps have emerged: naturalism and justificationism. Naturalism attributes the failure of knowledge in these cases to the cognizer's failure to stand in a strong natural position vis-à-vis the proposition believed. Justificationism traces the failure to the cognizer's failure to be strongly justified in his belief. My aim is to reconcile these camps by offering a version of naturalism, a reliability theory of knowledge, that conforms to the central justificationist tenets. I argue that proposed reliability theories of knowledge, reliable indication theories, offer no prospect of a reconciliation because they misdiagnose failed knowledge in such a way as to violate a basic justificationist tenet. Proposed versions of justificationism, it turns out, fare no better with this tenet. I offer an alternative reliability theory of knowledge, a reliable process theory, that conforms to the justificationist tenet.

One source of persistent contention in recent epistemology has been the question how to diagnose cases of what we may call "failed knowledge", that is, cases of justified true belief that does not constitute knowledge, Gettier cases.\(^1\) This question has been so central to the recent development of the theory of knowledge that proposed theories of knowledge are now divided according to their diagnoses of these cases, and theories are chiefly supported by their ability to accommodate and explain these cases.\(^2\) Two rival camps have emerged: naturalism and justificationism. Naturalism attributes the failure of knowledge in these cases to the cognizer's failure to stand in a strong natural position vis-à-vis the proposition believed. The favored version of naturalism, the reliability approach, identifies the strong position with reliable belief.\(^3\) Justificationism, on the other hand, traces the failure of knowledge to the cognizer's failure to be strongly justified in his belief.\(^4\)

My aim in this paper is to reconcile naturalism and justificationism by offering a version of naturalism, a reliability theory of knowledge, that conforms to the central justificationist tenets. Proposed reliability theories offer no prospect of a reconciliation because, as I will argue, they violate the basic tenets of justificationism. They avoid reference to justification in their diagnoses of failed knowledge. Justificationists have accordingly accused them of succeeding in their diagnoses only at the expense of sneaking the notion of justification into their charac-
terizations of knowledge. In sections 1 and 2, I will support this accusation. This accusation, however, can only be the beginning of an objection to the reliability theories. The objection that the notion of justification is unavailable for use by reliability theories has been rendered obsolete by the recent rise of plausible reliability theories of justification. In section 3, I will complete the justificationist accusation by arguing that no reliability theory of justification may supplement the proposed reliability theories of knowledge. In section 4, I will describe an alternative reliability theory.

1. RELIABLE INDICATION: A NATURALISTIC ACCOUNT OF RELEVANT CONTRARIES?

The proposed reliability theories of knowledge are one and all reliable indication theories. These theories are suggested by cases of failed knowledge like this one, proposed by Alvin Goldman (and attributed by him to Carl Ginet):

Case 1: Sally Barnbrain is walking in the countryside near her town and sees a barn $b$. As a result she forms the belief that $b$ is a barn. Unknown to her, however, the countryside is full of barn-facsimiles—papier-mache facades that look like barns from her perspective but are not.

In this case, though we would allow that her belief is justified and true, we would deny that it constitutes knowledge. The reliable indication theory explains the failure of knowledge on the ground that Sally's belief that $b$ is a barn does not reliably indicate that $b$ is a barn. For, if it were the case that $b$ is a barn-facsimile, Sally would still believe that $b$ is a barn—hence, it is not true that if it were the case that $b$ is a barn-facsimile, Sally would not believe that $b$ is a barn. Sally does not know that $b$ is a barn because, for some relevant contrary proposition (namely, that $b$ is a barn-facsimile), it is not true that she would not believe that $b$ is a barn if this proposition were true. More generally, $S$ knows that $p$ only if $S$'s belief that $p$ reliably indicates that $p$, in the sense that, for any relevant contrary $r$ of $p$, if it were the case that $r$, $S$ would not believe that $p$.

The chief question besetting the reliable indication theory is how to specify the range of relevant contraries. To remain in keeping with naturalism, the theory must offer a naturalistic account of relevance, and to remain within the spirit of the reliable indication theory, the account of relevance must be formulated in such a way that fulfillment of the