ABSTRACT. In this article a discourse (sequence of sentences) is regarded as a verbalization of some interactive cognitive process (discussion) which may be represented in form of a logical-cognitive scheme as a model of this discourse. Such model is elaborated on the ground of logical-cognitive theory of practical reasoning (Ishmuratov, 1987) by using the definitions of analytical rules for construing model sets (Smullyan, 1968). The discourse’s formal language is defined and takes into account the significance of quest schemes (forms of questionable propositions) which are included in different kinds of intensional (intentional, cognitive) contexts of discourse expressions. The discourse model is described in terms of cognitive interpretations which determine conditions of the actualization of cognitive events as elements of the discourse semantic. The peculiarities of this model are explained by deciding one cognitive riddle.

A sequence of sentences $A_1, \ldots, A_n$ may be interpreted as a discourse if it is presupposed that one or more persons having their own aims produced these sentences in accordance with common rules of interaction (Apostel, 1982; Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Gross and Sidner, 1990; Ishmuratov, 1990). The analytic model of discourse proposed is a tool for investigating properties of discussion norms and necessary preconditions of discussion, and may be regarded as an abstract normative scheme of discussion which must be useful for appreciating real discussion, its strategy, screen, plot, etc. (Litman, Allen 1990).

I support the cognitive approach in its intentional mode (Searle, 1983, 1990; Searle and Vanderveken, 1985) and regard asking questions as representing a special kind of intentional (cognitive) state of a person who informs another person about his desire to know that it is necessary to reach his own aim (Hintikka, 1974; Allen, 1983; Allen and Perrault, 1980).

This intentional state is a person’s knowledge about his ignorance and may be represented as a logical ‘equation with unknown quantities’ (Ishmuratov, 1989, p. 167). Descriptions of these states may be included in different kinds of propositional contexts. Look at some sentences and their formal schemes.
What is Truth? 
(1) What is Truth? 
(2) Christ knows what is Truth. 
(3) Pilate doesn’t know what is Truth. 
(4) Pilate wants to know what is Truth. 
(5) Go and know what is Truth! 
(6) Who knows what is Truth? 
(7) Christ believes that * is Truth. 
(8) Christ believes that he knows what is truth. 
(9) Who believes that he knows what is truth?

That which one may call a *quest scheme* is a direct question (1), a part of a direct question (6), a statement of knowing (2), of unknowing (3), of desiring or demanding (4), (5). Any quest form is not to include as the part of any belief-context (7), (8), (9) and controversy any statement form is not to be the part of unknowing context from the view of uttering person. (Ishmuratov, 1989, p. 162). For example, one may say, “He doesn’t know that truth is *”, however, it is “illocutive suicide” to say, “I don’t know that truth is *” (Vendler, 1976), but one may say, “I doubt that truth is *”. So, *quest scheme* is an exact description of not only unknowing but doubting: *quest variable* assigns an unknown part of the knowing, and *quest constant* marks some doubtful part of the knowing in a general question. Let us regard some variants of a general question which are expressed by different intonations (stressed italic).

\[ \text{Is Truth Good?} \quad \text{Is Truth Good?} \quad \text{Is Truth Good?} \quad \text{Truth is Good, isn’t it?} \]

\[ ?(G, \text{Is}(G, T)) \quad ?(T, \text{Is}(G, T)) \quad ?(\text{Is}, \text{Is}(G, T)) \quad ?(\text{Is}(G, T), \text{Is}(G, T)) \]

Some examples of more complex quest schemes:

(10) Why does Christ believe that Truth is *?
\[ ?(p, \text{BECAUSE} (\text{B}(Ch, ?(x, \text{Is}(x, T))), p) \]

(11) Is Christ wise if he knows what is truth?
\[ ?(\text{Christ is wise, IF} (\text{K}(Ch, ?(x, T))), \text{Christ is wise}). \]

(12) Who asks whom what is Truth?
\[ ?(x, ?y(\text{ASK}(x, y, ?(z, \text{Is}(z, T)))). \]