Corporate crime typically has created special difficulties for the criminal law, both as a matter of theory and as a matter of enforcement. Although not all business firms engage in questionable or illegal practices, enough do, so that business deviance has come to be regarded as a persistent problem. An extensive literature now addresses both the nature and the causes of deviant behavior in business and ways to prevent and punish it.
Jay A. Sigler and Joseph E. Murphy's *Interactive Corporate Compliance: An Alternative to Regulatory Compulsion* is one attempt to sketch out a regulatory model that would reduce corporate deviance by transforming corporate crime prevention efforts from an external, adversarial approach to an internal, interactive, and cooperative one.

Much of the corporate deviance problem can be attributed to the business corporation's organizational characteristics and, in particular, to the structure of the public corporation. Consider, for example, widely dispersed share ownership, which is a fundamental characteristic of the public corporation. Most public corporate investors have limited liability, small stakes relative to the entire collective wealth, and no day-to-day control over corporate activities. This capitalization technique enables actors to specialize and creates efficiency gains as financial backing is brought together with productive know-how. At the same time, this technique permits full-time corporate actors, such as managers and employees, to make use of greater resources than the typical individual can assemble for her own purposes. One consequence of the corporate form's superior capacity to organize financial resources is that corporate deviance can have profound and widespread social effects, because the corporate form frequently permits human endeavors on a magnified scale. The contrast can be illustrated by two hypothetical cases of impaired motor vehicle operation. A drunken automobile driver creates an enhanced risk of death, personal injury, and property damage, although on a relatively limited basis per incident of drunkenness, and his capacity to do harm may be further circumscribed by some degree of awareness on the driver's part that he also is put directly at risk by his misconduct. By comparison, the same level of drunkenness during the operation of an oil supertanker risks social harm of breathtakingly large scope, even though the tanker operators may not be personally threatened by their misconduct.

The situation is complicated by the disaggregated nature of the corporate form. Frequently, no one individual or group of individuals within the

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5 A public corporation has a relatively large number of shareholders who are able to buy and sell shares in a public market.