Are there cases in which an object \( x \) is the same \( F \) as an object \( y \) but \( x \) is not the same \( G \) as \( y \), even though \( x \) is a \( G \)? An affirmative answer will have drastic repercussions on one's account of identity and on one's quantification theory. For suppose that the expression '\( x \) is the same \( F \) as \( y \)' can be understood as '\( x \) is an \( F \) and \( y \) is an \( F \) and \( x \) is identical with \( y \)', and that '\( x \) is not the same \( G \) as \( y \)' can be understood as 'it is not the case that \( x \) is a \( G \) and \( y \) is a \( G \) and \( x \) is identical with \( y \)'. Then one may reason as follows:

1. \( Fx. Fy. \ x=y \)
2. \( \sim (Gx. Gy. \ x=y) \)
3. \( Gx \)
4. \( Gy \)
5. \( Gx. Gy \) from 3, 4
6. \( \sim (x=y) \) from 2, 5
7. \( x=y. \ \sim (x=y) \) from 1, 6

A person who holds that there are cases in which an object \( x \) is the same \( F \) as an object \( y \) but not the same \( G \) as an object \( y \), even though \( x \) is a \( G \), must either deny that '\( x \) is the same \( F \) as \( y \)' can be understood as '\( x \) is an \( F \) and \( y \) is an \( F \) and \( x \) is identical with \( y \)' and that '\( x \) is not the same \( G \) as \( y \)' can be understood as 'it is not the case that \( x \) is a \( G \) and \( y \) is a \( G \) and \( x \) is identical with \( y \)' or deny that the step from 1 and 3 to 4 is valid. Since in many cases, including the example discussed at length below, the truth of '\( Gy \)' is assumed as a premise, it is the former alternative that is the centre of attention. Adopting this course may lead one to P. T. Geach's doctrine that 'is identical with' is a fragmentary expression which has no significance unless one says or means something of the form 'is the same \( F \) as'.

John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Ch. 27,

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is the most prominent advocate of the view that there are cases in which
an object $x$ is the same $F$ as an object $y$ but $x$ is not the same $G$ as $y$, even
though $x$ is a $G$. One should not conclude that Locke also held Geach’s
doctrine. It is true that Locke says of identity that
to conceive and judge of it aright, we must consider what idea the word it is applied
stands for: it being one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a
third the same person ... (II, xxvii. 7).

But his point here is merely that the conditions under which identity of a
substance preserved differ from those under which identity of a man is
preserved, and these in turn differ from those under which identity of a
person is preserved. Moreover, the sentence which opens the chapter:
Another occasion the mind often takes of comparing is the very being of things, when,
considering anything as existing at any determined place and time, we compare it with
itself existing at another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and diversity ...
is hardly suggestive of Geach’s doctrine.

Locke argues as follows. The idea in our minds of which the sound
‘man’ in our mouths is a sign, is nothing else but of an animal of such a
certain form – a living organised body. ‘Person’ stands for a thinking in-
telligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself,
the same thinking thing in different times and places; ‘person’ is a forensic
term. The same man is the same continued life communicated to different
particles of matter as they happen successively to be joined to the or-
organised living body. Personal identity depends only on having the same
consciousness: as far as consciousness can be extended backwards to any
past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person. In a
given case consciousness might be preserved, while identity of the organised
living body was not, or vice versa. Hence there might occur a case in
which an object $x$ was the same person as an object $y$ while not the same
man as $y$ (II, xxvii. 15), or a case in which $x$ was the same man as $y$ while
not the same person as $y$, i.e. in which the same man at different times
made different persons (II, xxvii. 20).

Is Locke correct? Let us take up Locke’s own example of the prince
and the cobbler (II, xxvii. 15). Suppose that at time $t_1$ there exists a prince,
Charles, in a palace, and a cobbler, Jack, in a shop. Charles is both a
person and a man, and so is Jack. At time $t_2$ the body in the shop acquires
a consciousness similar to that of Charles. There then exists in the shop