ABSTRACT. I set out the standard view about alleged examples of failure of transmission of warrant, respond to two cases for the view, and argue that the view is false. The first argument for the view neglects the distinction between believing a proposition on the basis of a justification and merely having a justification to believe a proposition. The second argument for the view neglects the position that one’s justification for believing a conclusion can be one’s premise for the conclusion, rather than simply one’s justification for the premise. Finally, the view is false since it is inconsistent with the closure of knowledge as closure is properly understood.

1. INTRODUCTION

Is there something illegitimate about the following pieces of reasoning?

**Zebra**

The Zebra Premise: The animal is a zebra.
So,
The Zebra Conclusion: The animal isn't a cleverly disguised mule.
[where the Zebra warrant for believing the Zebra premise is that one has a visual experience as of an animal which looks like a zebra standing in a pen ...]

**Soccer**

The Soccer Premise: A soccer goal was just scored.
So,
The Soccer Conclusion: A soccer game is in progress, rather than a simulation of a soccer game.
[where the Soccer warrant for the Soccer premise is that the ball was kicked between the two white posts, the crowd went wild, the “referee” signaled that a goal was scored ...]
Election

The Election Premise: Jones has just voted for Amy.

So,

The Election Conclusion: An election is taking place, rather than a mock election.

[where the Election warrant for the Election premise is that Jones has marked Amy’s name on a ballot in apparently electoral circumstances …]¹

The standard view of these pieces of reasoning – shared by Crispin Wright, Martin Davies, Michael McKinsey, and others – is that they are not ways of justifying one’s beliefs in their conclusions given the justifications one has for believing their premises.² On this line of thought, one does have a certain warrant or justification for believing the premise, and the premise does entail the conclusion, but one nevertheless does not gain any justification for believing the conclusion by deducing it from the premise.

The basic argument for the standard view proceeds broadly as follows.³ First, in each case, one has the relevant justification for believing the premise only if one has some independent justification for the conclusion. Second, if one has the relevant justification for believing the premise only if one has some independent justification for the conclusion, then one cannot acquire any justification for the conclusion by deducing the conclusion from the premise (when one has the justification in question for the premise). Therefore, it is concluded, the pieces of reasoning do not transmit warrant.

If the standard view is right, then subjects presumably cannot know that skeptical hypotheses are false through inferences from their mundane knowledge. However, if the standard view is wrong, then presumably subjects can know that skeptical hypotheses are false through inferences from their mundane knowledge. Thus what is at stake is not just the legitimacy of the Zebra/Soccer/Election inferences, but the legitimacy of certain Moorean responses to skepticism as well. These responses try to explain how we can know that skeptical hypotheses are false through inferences from our