In *Rationality and Religious Commitment*, Audi argues that religious commitment can be rational. Audi is concerned with religious commitment in a robust sense, which includes not just one’s beliefs, but also the behavioral, moral, dispositional, and aesthetic dimensions involved in the religious life. He argues that a non-dogmatic religious commitment suffused with appropriate humility, particularly in the interpersonal and political sphere, can be rational. But such a commitment need not be a watered-down or circumscribed commitment: on the contrary, the deeper the commitment reaches into all the dimensions of her life, the more integrated and rich is the life of the rational religious person.

It is natural to start with the exact notion of rationality at issue. Audi distinguishes four separate normative ideals that can apply to beliefs: beliefs can be rational; beliefs can be reasonable; beliefs can be justified; and beliefs can amount to knowledge. Audi stresses that these first three notions apply to conduct as well as belief, e.g., practical as well as theoretical rationality. His view of rationality is a well-groundedness view: the rationality of particular beliefs and conduct depends on their having good grounding in experience, direct or indirect, where indirect experience includes (among other things) logical and inferential reasoning. Whether an individual is overall (“globally”) rational will depend in part on whether her individual beliefs, desires, and actions are rational. Audi is also at times concerned with the stronger normative notion of reasonableness, which he takes to mean (in the global sense) governed by reason or (in the sense of individual beliefs and desires) exhibiting support by reasons, not merely consonant with reason as rationality requires.
Audi also devotes considerable space to what religious commitment consists in. Audi distinguishes between seven different locutions involving “faith” in English, and isolates four which are not reducible to others: propositional faith (faith *that*), attitudinal faith (faith *in*), creedal faith (a faith), and global faith (person of faith). He also distinguishes between two kinds of propositional faith, doxastic and fiducial faith, which differ in that the former is accompanied by belief whereas the latter is not. As a general rule, belief bears a stronger relationship to how the agent represents the world than does fiducial faith, since belief is truth-valued and fiducial faith is compatible with more doubt about its object. However, faith (both fiducial and doxastic) bears a stronger relationship to the agent’s non-truth-valued mental states than belief does, since faith tends to require a positive valuation of its object and tends to eliminate negative emotions such as fear. Thus, fiducial faith is an important cognitive category that won’t be evaluable solely in terms of its relationship to the truth. Audi also explores the behavioral and emotional dimensions of religious commitment, and distinguishes three axes along which a religious commitment can vary: its strength, its depth, and its breadth. In general, the stronger or deeper or broader the commitment is, the higher the bar it has to meet to count as rational. But a religion itself may recommend that one’s commitment to it not outrun the grounds one has, so even if rationality doesn’t recommend the deepest possible commitment, there need be no conflict between one’s duties as specified by one’s religion and one’s duties as a rational agent.

Audi considers the positive support for religious commitment. On the theoretical side, he argues that for many people, testimony and religious experience can rationally ground religious commitments. He also claims that it is rational for some people to think that the arguments from natural theology provide some support for God’s existence, though such support isn’t required in order for religious commitment to be rational. Furthermore, one might have adequate reason to believe that religious commitment would be cognitively rational if nurtured, even if one doesn’t currently have rational grounds for religious commitment: one might have inductive or testimonial evidence that one would rationally believe if one engaged the arguments or opened oneself to religious experience. In the normal case, Audi argues, religious experience and collateral support from arguments or testimony rationally ground the intellectual component of religious commitment.

On the practical side, Audi argues that religious conduct coheres with what we ought to do from the point of view of moral philosophy considered solely as a secular enterprise, although some religious conduct may be supererogatory from this point of view. In the course of this discussion, several key claims emerge. The first is that there are many ways—both religious and secular—of discovering and apprehending our moral obligations. In harmony with this claim, Audi advocates for a theory of divine commandability rather than divine commandedness (though he leaves open other possibilities), since the former allows that our obligations can be known on non-theological grounds. The final claim is that classical theism is consistent with most normative ethical positions held by contemporary philosophers: classical theism generally provides a lot of latitude in this domain. This chapter exemplifies a recurring conclusion in this book: that religious sources of knowledge and secular sources are mutually enhancing.