Chinese philosophy (Confucianism in particular) used to be under attack by feminists for its sexist thought, such as “male superiority/female inferiority” (nanzun nübei 男尊女卑) and the three bonds (sangang 三綱) or three obediences (sancong 三從). In response to feminist critiques, scholars have reexamined Chinese canonical texts from a feminist perspective and given various new interpretations of these texts. Defenders have argued that “Chinese philosophy” is richly diverse; if Confucianism is unfriendly to women, other traditions in Chinese philosophy might be feminist-friendly. Daoism, for example, is traditionally understood as a philosophy respecting yin and degrading yang (chongyin yiyang 崇陰抑陽), which implies, in theory, that wives possessed a higher position than husbands. Defenders of Confucianism have argued that “Confucianism” is also a richly diverse tradition, in which one can find both gender-inequality and gender-equality. For example, although DONG Zhongshu 董仲舒 is in support of an unequal gender relationship (wives should subordinate to husbands), LÜ Kun 呂坤 suggests a different kind of relationship between couples, namely, moral equality. In general, many scholars believe that more attention should be paid to how Chinese philosophy transforms itself as it moves to a new millennium and interacts with gender studies.

The eighteen essays in *The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese Philosophy and Gender* provide up-to-date research on how the three teachings (sanjiao 三教), namely, Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, can be made to have a dialogue with modern discussion on feminism. According to different Chinese scholarship across different areas and times, Ann Pang-White, the editor of the volume under review, divides the book into four parts. The first four essays, belonging to Part I, “Confucian Approaches: Ancient and Medieval,” discuss the following topics, respectively:

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married women’s unique moral dilemma (Paul R. Goldin), sexism’s formation process across the three teachings (Tak-Ling Terry Woo), Zhu Xi’s normative and descriptive attitudes toward women (Ann Pang-White), and Queen Sohae’s contribution to gender equality (Kim Hye-Kyung).

Following such a “Confucian” approach, the next five papers in Part II focus on the dialogue between Chinese philosophy and contemporary debate in care ethics and self-other relation. Li Chenyang argues that care ethics are incompatible with justice ethics, and Confucian ethics in the Mengzi is a type of care ethics. Ellie Hua Wang argues that care in the Xunzi is a deeper moral emotion than that in feminism. Li-Hsiang Lisa Roselee explains how filial piety (xiao) works in a caring community. Another two authors investigate relationships in different ways — Karyn Lai focuses on parent-child and friendship, and Chan Sin-Yee discusses the relationship between bisexuality and homosexuality in Confucian texts.

In Part III, “Daoist Approach,” five scholars build their theories on the following paired dynamic concept: yin and yang. Based on the Huangdi Neijing, a foundational text of Chinese medicine, Robin R. Wang argues that yin-yang, as a thinking paradigm, can shed light on sex/gender dynamics. Galia Patt-Shamir applies the yin-yang thinking model to solve the problem of how self-identity can be achieved through self-sacrificing. Susan Scheibler argues that according to Daoism, things contain both yin and yang, this insight of Daoism would then enable it to provide a response to the argument that homosexuality is a metaphysical problem. Ma Lin would agree with this Daoist view of things as dynamic-patterns; however, there is a difference between Ma and Scheibler regarding the relationships of yin and yang. Ma argues that yin is more important than yang and the Dao in the Daodejing is “a philosophy in feminine” (246). Eric S. Nelson and Yang Liu, in their chapter, argue that according to the Yijing, yin and yang are open to infinite possibilities and obtaining meanings only in specific context.

Part IV, “Buddhist Approaches,” focuses on the possibility of a philosophy beyond sex/gender. Different from the Daoist co-relative thinking pattern, Sandra A. Wawrytko and Ann Pang-White put forth nondualism and nonself separately and show a neither-nor thinking paradigm. Lu Hwei-Syin and Hu Hsiao-Lan, on a practical level, show how Buddhism is friendly to all human beings, including men, women, and the LGBT community.

Given that some articles in this book do not fit neatly into the category provided, I now want to provide a different way of organizing this book in terms of five major themes followed by my comments, which aim to stimulate further discussion.

First and foremost, the first main theme is the question of how to understand yin and yang, without which other topics cannot be clarified. We can find four interpretations of yin and yang in this book: (1) as two sides of the same thing, (2) as two interdependent entities, (3) as a co-relative thinking, and finally, (4) as two basic symbols: — (yin) and — (yang) with countless possibilities. One implication of scholars recognizing this fact about the multiple meanings of yin and yang is that they have reached a consensus, which is that yin and yang do not necessarily refer to women and men. Rather, they represent a way of thinking and can describe the relationships between genders. I agree with their assumption that yin and yang are roots or foundations of Chinese gender philosophy, it provides a complementary-based paradigm between men and women.