NEGOTIATING WITH BEIJING: WHAT SHOULD TAIPEI AND A THIRD PARTY KNOW?
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This article examines the People's Republic of China's dialectical negotiation process, including its method, conditions, form, style, nature, level, issues, time/timing/length, location, and concessions. It also discusses a third party's role in the negotiation between Taipei and Beijing. Although history does not repeat itself, what the Chinese Communists have done in the past could help us to understand their present negotiation theory and practice. In this article, I am proposing a dialectical negotiating model as contrasted with the more conventional "linear," sequential negotiating model proposed by Lucian W. Pye and Richard H. Solomon for understanding the People's Republic of China's negotiating pattern. Lack of understanding of this model creates a strong sense of distrust and mistrust between both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Taipei certainly does not want to give up its sovereign status nor does Beijing want to see Taiwan become an independent state.

Although the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) have been politically separated since 1949, this did not mean the end of negotiations and exchange of views between the two parties. Since July 1956, the journal-

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1. Up to this day, Taipei has not relinquished its sovereignty over mainland China, and Beijing has not given up Taiwan. On the question of Outer Mongolia, the
ist Cao Juren had been relaying messages back and forth across the Taiwan Strait\(^2\); as early as October 1958, Mao Zedong offered peace talks with Chiang Kai-shek; in December 1963, it was reported that Zhou Enlai met with one or two of the following three political figures from Taiwan on ROC-controlled Dongsha Island in the South China Sea: President Chiang Kai-shek, his son Chiang Ching-kuo, or Premier Chen Cheng of the Executive Yuan (Council)\(^3\); in the mid-1960s, Chiang Kai-shek met with Cao Juren. The result was that, in 1965 Chiang, reportedly, agreed to hold talks on peaceful reunification based on the following six conditions: \(^4\)

1. Chiang Kai-shek can return to mainland China with his subordinates and can settle in any province of China except Zhejiang. Chiang will remain as the top leader of Guomintang (GMD);

2. Chiang Ching-kuo will be the governor of Taiwan Province. Taiwan will retain what it has for twenty years except giving up rights over diplomatic and military affairs and agreeing to Beijing’s request that tillers have their own land. This agreement will be renegotiated after twenty years;

\(^2\) The question is debatable. The PRC has recognized Outer Mongolia as a country, while “[t]he ROC government will continue to regard [Outer Mongolia] as a part of its national territory politically . . . but the area will be differentiated from the rest of the Chinese mainland in economic affairs,” as the ROC’s Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (MTAC) explained. See Free China Journal (Taipei), December 12, 1997, p.1.

\(^3\) Ibid., February 28, 1998, p.9. See also Lianhe zaobao (Singapore), March 5, 1998, p.20.

\(^4\) Cao’s daughter said more evidences are needed to substantiate whether the elder Chiang accepted the six conditions. See United Daily News (Taipei), March 10, 1998, p.8. For another scholar’s view, who said both Mao and the elder Chiang used Cao Juren for their own purposes, see ibid., March 11, 1998, p.9. A person who worked for Chiang Ching-guo said Cao should not have been the messenger. See ibid., March 22, 1998, p.9.