Newton herself raises more obvious problems with the theory. One such problem is how a theory which equates understanding with imagery can account for our understanding of abstract ideas. Another is that if imagery constitutes understanding, why do some people claim that although they are conscious of understanding, they are not conscious, even upon reflection, of the presence of the imagery she contends constitutes understanding. In her book, Newton offers convincing solutions to these problems.

In sum, *Foundations of Understanding* is an exciting exploration of human cognition. It takes the insights of earlier philosophers from both the analytic and continental traditions and extends and grounds them by appeal to current scientific findings. It does so without ever forgetting the bodily nature of the subject who understands.

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This volume presents the revised text of the Gilbert Ryle Lectures given by the author at Trent University, Ontario, in 1995. It is commendable that the sponsors of the Ryle lectures have not limited themselves to philosophers of the analytic tradition, in which Ryle played such an important role, choosing on this occasion a distinguished representative of the Continental tradition. But we are living in a time when that distinction has in any case become outmoded, and as we look back, as Calvin Schrag points out here (pp. xiv), we may be able to see Ryle in a different light. It is well known that in his early years he reviewed Heidegger for *Mind*, giving the German philosopher a respectful if not uncritical reading. He reviewed other phenomenological writers as well. More importantly, his attack on the mind-body split may be read, together with the work of Merleau-Ponty and others, as part of a common 20th century effort to get beyond this aspect of the Cartesian legacy.

As if in recognition that the analytic-continental divide is no longer a burning issue, Schrag, ever a conciliatory thinker, has little to say about it. Though he mentions Ryle a few times, his reconciling attentions are directed to another and more recent rift, this one within the tradition of continental philosophy itself. Continuing the project he began in his *Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity* (1986) and continued in *The Resources of Rationality: A Response to the Postmodern Challenge* (1992, both Indiana University Press), Schrag is concerned here with the post-modern turn in recent
Continental philosophy and especially with its attacks on the concept of the subject. In France these attacks were directed at the tradition of Existential Phenomenology with which Schrag long identified himself. While he believes that reports of the death of the subject are greatly exaggerated, Schrag’s response is neither to counter-attack nor simply to defend his earlier views. Rather, he wants to take the post-modern turn seriously as an occasion for a new approach to the self.

Schrag is sympathetic to the critique that the modem conception of the self has been dominated by the epistemological concerns of Descartes: to be is principally to be a knower. And he agrees that the “subject” of knowledge has been treated as a privileged instance of substance in the metaphysical sense. What he will not accept is the view that in consequence of these criticisms it no longer makes sense to speak of the self at all, or to accord it a central place in our philosophical concerns. But if we can still speak of it, then how and in what terms? In an effort “to respond to the formidable challenge by the architects of postmodernity” he seeks “to resituate and refigure the portrait of the human self after its traditional metaphysical supports and epistemological guarantees have been called into question.” (p. 8).

Schrag’s response to the postmoderns is that if the unity provided by the epistemological and metaphysical subject is withdrawn, we are not left with the total fragmentation they often celebrate under the rubric of difference. Unity can be conceived in other terms. He believes it emerges if we ask not the metaphysical question of essence – the “what” question – but the more personal and vital “who” question. The “who”-self can then be described in four different spheres or modes of its being: discourse, action, community and transcendence. The four chapters of The Self After Postmodernity are devoted to each of these domains in turn. But this four-part examination intersects with another four-part division which represents the “cultural achievements of the human subject.” (5) To the standard “culture-spheres” of art, science and morality, derived from Weber via Habermas, Schrag wishes to add a fourth, religion. Here, too, he is not willing to accept the post-modern verdict that any attempt to unify these spheres is a dangerous totalization which elides into totalitarianism. Here, too, he seeks unity, but not a metaphysical unity, and not the sort of unity in which all difference is submerged.

“The self in discourse” (ch. 1) begins by acknowledging the widespread turn to language in 20th century philosophy. At the intersection of speech and language, discourse is the concrete form of the linguistic world in which we live. The postmoderns have emphasized the multiplicity and disparity of modes of discourse, language games, rhetorical strategies, while Habermas has linked different types of validity-claim with the culture-spheres of science, morality and art. Is there a place for the self in all this diversity? We can find it, ac-