The largely unanticipated end of the Cold War and the consequent difficulties in explaining its demise underline the need for a better understanding of rivalries in world politics. Over the past two centuries, apart from the Soviet-American relationship, a disproportionate number of interstate conflicts have occurred between pairs of states referred to as dyads. After a prolonged period of conflict these dyadic relationships are placed in the category of enduring rivalry. As the subsequent analysis will show, the India-Pakistan dyad that is the focus of this book also qualifies as an enduring rivalry. In order to understand the key elements of an enduring rivalry, why India and Pakistan are considered enduring rivals, and how they might conduct negotiations, this chapter expands upon the concept of enduring rivalry and defines the characteristics of the negotiation process.

The first section of the chapter describes the concept of enduring rivalry and lays out the criteria for considering the India-Pakistan dyad an enduring rivalry. This section emphasizes that in order to seek solutions to ongoing and future conflicts it is essential to study the past interactions of states.

The next section of the chapter examines the negotiation process and formulates an analytical framework based on the literature on negotiation and conflict resolution. This framework of negotiation forms the core tool for my analysis of India-Pakistan relations, with specific reference to five disputes. Two of these disputes were successfully settled through the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty and the 1968 Rann of Kutch Award, while disputes over Siachen, Sir Creek, and the Tulbul/Wular project are ongoing.
An abundance of writings is available on the concept of enduring rivalry. This particular aspect of conflict research attracts attention because numerous studies show that militarized conflict is likely to recur between states that have fought in the past and have lingering disputes to settle. Experts refer to repeated conflicts between the same states as enduring rivalries, and they explain the concept of enduring rivalry in various ways and with the help of different parameters. Daniel Geller’s article summarizes definitions of enduring rivalry proposed by several experts.

F.W. Wayman considers any dyad engaged in two or more militarized disputes over a ten-year period to be involved in an enduring rivalry. P.F. Diehl and J. Kingston consider a rivalry enduring when the dyad experiences three or more conflicts over a fifteen-year period. According to Gary Goertz and Diehl, “Enduring rivalry can be defined as repeated conflict among the same set of states.” They argue that 45 percent of militarized disputes since 1816 occurred among enduring rivals and that there is a strong possibility conflict will recur in the future even if the dispute is resolved through a formal treaty with a peaceful redrawing of boundaries. It is therefore pertinent to study the pattern of past engagements in order to understand the future trajectory of bilateral relations between enduring rivals. The most serious of enduring rivals are believed to be almost eight times more prone to experience a military conflict than states involved in isolated conflicts. Enduring rivalries do not result in a disproportionate number of territorial changes; yet, when such transfers do occur, they are three times more likely to involve military conflict than territorial changes in isolated disputes.

Drawing on data from the Markov chain analysis of 456 militarized disputes that occurred between 1816 and 1986, Geller suggests that power parity and shifts toward parity are more likely (approximately twice as likely) to result in war than is a condition of power preponderance. He argues that rivals fighting over power parity, shifts toward parity, or other issues could create conditions that might be exploited through the use of force. Geller suggests that enduring rivalries can be arranged into three categories: major power versus major power, major power versus minor power, and minor power versus minor power. Based on the conflict data analysis of militarized disputes between 1816 and 1986, Geller places the India-Pakistan dyad as an enduring rivalry in the minor-versus-minor power category.