During the same period of time in which Dworkin has been perfecting his theory of equality for life within liberal democracies, another group of political theorists have been arguing that the demands of socio-economic justice are operative not merely within states but also across state borders (see Beitz, 1979, Part 3; Barry, 1982; Shue, 1983; Pogge, 1989, ch. 6; Moellendorf, 2002; Tan, 2004; Caney, 2005). Many of these cosmopolitan thinkers make the suggestion that if every human life has intrinsic worth and equally so—perhaps because all human beings share a capacity for suffering and an ability to form and pursue meaningful conceptions of the good—it remains unclear why the duty to show equal concern and respect is limited only to those whom the government governs and to fellow citizens. If these capacities are shared by every human being and not just by those one regards as fellow members of a narrow political community, then to restrict the scope of economic rights to domestic politics seems arbitrary from a moral point of view. What is more, some scholars of international law now point to the creation of juridical entitlements in the areas of foreign aid, price stabilisation, trade, lending and the global commons based on overarching principles of distributive justice (Franck, 1995).1

Thus far Dworkin has been reluctant to make a similar move on the grounds that distributive justice is peculiar to true political communities and not arbitrarily so. The aim of this chapter is to critically examine this assumption. While it may be difficult to interpret current international affairs as displaying the characteristics which Dworkin identifies with a true political community, I intend to argue nevertheless that the two principles of human dignity do point in the direction of global egalitarian rights. I shall argue that these rights apply to various rules, institutions, practices and individual actions, not all of which have received the attention they deserve. Among the sites of global distributive justice

that have been discussed at length in the literature are trade tariffs and structural adjustment policies. But I try to show that certain other international practices are also appropriately governed by principles of justice given the profound and pervasive impact they have on people’s lives. I have in mind not only the international exploitation of, and trade in, natural resources but also foreign aid including official development assistance and humanitarian aid. Having established these additional sites for the application of global egalitarian rights, Chapter 6 sets out to interpret these rights in terms of the abstract idea of global luck egalitarianism, while Chapter 7 further refines this interpretation by developing a version of global equality of resources.

Three ways of doing normative political theory at the global level

Of the political theorists who grapple with the question of distributive justice at the global level, many subscribe to moral cosmopolitanism: the view that individuals are the ultimate units of moral concern and that the intrinsic worth that attaches to human beings attaches to every human being equally (see Pogge, 1992a, p. 48; 2002, p. 169; Tan, 2004, p. 1). Moral cosmopolitanism dovetails with at least one of the two principles of human dignity upheld by Dworkin, namely, the principle of intrinsic value. The crucial difference arises, however, when we move from the level of deep moral principle to particular domains of social activity. Dworkin subscribes to the view that the principle of intrinsic value does not imply principles of egalitarian justice outside of the context of a true political community. The political cosmopolitan, by contrast, affirms that world affairs are just if and only if equal concern and respect is shown across state borders and not merely within borders. But how can the political cosmopolitan justify this move?

Consider three principal methods. The first begins with *a priori* moral reasoning the purpose of which is to establish independent principles of justice. These principles are independent in the sense that we do not draft them with an eye on the spheres of human life to which they are to be applied (cf. Cohen, 2003). Only when we come to reflect on particular circumstances do we consider making pragmatic compromises. By way of illustration, Robert Goodin starts from the fundamental moral conviction that everyone has a general duty of justice to aid the vulnerable everywhere, where being in a position to help is enough to generate a responsibility to do so, provided that this is not unreasonably burdensome (Goodin, 1985). In the case of international affairs,