I will now discuss the talking cure in its relation to mental disorder to highlight differences between an empirical approach and an elucidatory one. Freud, Jung and the cognitive therapists were psychologists whose quest was the essential structure of the mind and the causes of neurosis and psychosis. In the early twentieth century Freud and Jung formed an enthusiastic partnership to further ‘the cause’. Freud wrote, ‘Nothing can befall our cause as long as the understanding between you and me remains unclouded’ (McGuire 1974, 212 F, October 1910). Jung wrote, ‘Anyone who knows your science has veritably eaten of the tree of paradise and become clairvoyant’ (Ibid., 28 J, May 1907).

Jung, especially, held that psychology constituted the fundamental discipline on which all sciences should be based, as it grasped the subjective factor which underlay them (Shamdasani 2003, p. 15). This belief enabled them to make massive generalisations not only about neurosis and psychosis but about civilisation, religion, art and ‘primitive’ people. They ignored the work of Frege (1984), Husserl (1900, Vol. 1) and many other thinkers, including Wittgenstein (TLP 4.1121), who pointed out that psychologism, the belief that psychology was the basis of logic and so all sciences, did not make sense.

Ironically, because the various schools of psychoanalysis misunderstand the nature of subjectivity, they are ruled by it. The relationship between Freud and Jung moved from unjustified optimism and idealization to mutual rejection and denigration of each other’s theories and persons. Members of the various schools are usually unable to detach themselves from their founders, idealizing and identifying with their theories.

Freud believed that knowledge is passed on from father to son. He explained the rivalry between him and his ex-disciples by his oral theory.
of the relationship between father and son. The son ends up either as a *slave*, inheriting by imitation, or as an *impudent puppy*, inheriting by biting and trying to swallow the theories. This is the history of most of his disciples. It was a father–son relationship in which the disciple is taught to imagine himself and the encounter with the patient in the way Freud did (Breger 2000; Davies 2009, pp. 98–123). Freud thought theories are a possession which are passed on, like an inheritance. If this were so, rational judgement between various theories would be impossible, and there would be no truth. A theory in science is for use in a particular situation; there are complicated criteria as to its usefulness, and it is not to be identified with and possessed.

Freud was fond of the metaphor of depth; it was his ‘discovery’ of the unconscious causes and sexual origins of mental disorder that were crucial. Jung appealed to the heights, he wrote:

> Were I a philosopher, I should continue in this Platonic strain and say: Somewhere, in a ‘place beyond the skies’, there is a prototype or primordial image of the mother that is pre-existent and supraordinate to all phenomena in which the ‘maternal’, in the broadest sense of the term, is manifest. (Jung 1938–54 *CW* Vol. 9, Part 1, 75)

Both were visionaries and sought the sublime and the ideal; for one it was in the heights and for the other in the depths. For both it was in the mind. Neither recognised that theories are created by human beings within a historical context; they depend on a background of concepts and presuppositions that are often unacknowledged. They are not produced by some ‘subjective factor’ in the mind. The user is necessarily ‘outside’ the representations of the theory; this enables him to use it. If he identifies with it, he is then subject to it; he cannot think freely.

Freud, Jung and most analysts surrendered to enthusiasm. This, Locke tells us, is ‘founded neither on reason nor divine revelation, but rising from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the persuasions and actions of men than either of those two, or both together’ (Locke 1706, Book 4, Chapter 19, Section 7). Locke, who was a physician as well as a philosopher, pointed out, in his perceptive chapter on enthusiasm, that it tends to occur in men with a melancholy disposition or who are conceited. Such people have a corrupt judgement because they tyrannise over their own minds, allowing beliefs to be imposed on them; so they, in turn, dictate to others. They do not allow truth to show itself freely through the deliverances of language (Ibid., Book 4, Chapter 19, Section 2).