13 Signing the Treaties

In the period between Dulles's return from the Canberra talks and the signing of the Anzus Pact in San Francisco on 1 September 1951, there was considerable uncertainty in Canberra and Wellington and in their respective embassies in Washington about the future of the American guarantee. This anxiety focused on four matters. First, there was the question of Philippine membership. Secondly, the attitude of Britain remained a major anxiety. Thirdly, there was the timing of the announcement of a guarantee in relation to the Japanese peace settlement. Finally, the overriding worry was the basic question as to whether the US government would accept the Canberra draft. This fundamental issue depended to a major degree on the attitude of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was a measure of Dulles's persistence and skilful negotiation, and the firmness of Acheson and the State Department, that the guarantee was achieved with very little variation from the draft agreed in Canberra.

THE QUESTION OF PHILIPPINE MEMBERSHIP

On the question of whether the Philippines should be a party to the treaty, Dulles had categorically reserved the US position while in Canberra. Shortly after his return to Washington, he told the British, Australian and New Zealand ambassadors that the United States wanted to include the Philippines. When Berendsen asked whether an attack on the Philippines would have to be regarded as an attack on all the parties, Dulles reminded him that the Canberra draft did not incorporate such Atlantic pact-type wording.1 While Australia and New Zealand had never made any secret of their preference for a tripartite treaty, they were both prepared to accept Philippine membership if that was the price which had to be paid. Menzies wrote to Holland on 16 March 1951 saying it would be 'inconceivable' that Australia would oppose the Philippines if it might endanger the security guarantee. The New Zealand Cabinet did not want 'anything to do with the Philippines', but Holland and Doidge persuaded their colleagues they must be prepared to pay the price.2 On this matter the Anzac position had long been clear.

It is highly ironical, therefore, that it was probably British objec-
tions to the inclusion of the Philippines which eventually dissuaded the Americans, whereas Australians and New Zealanders believed that the British were simply employing delaying tactics to hamstring the tripartite treaty. There were, in fact, fears in Canberra that the British were still hoping they could ward it off in favour of a presidential declaration.\textsuperscript{3} McIntosh, of New Zealand, expressed these fears with his customary lack of inhibition:

The United Kingdom hate the whole thing and, according to the Australians, they have been doing their best to head the Americans off and get them to substitute a Presidential Declaration ... The British obviously are doing their best to torpedo the whole thing and they want to represent to the Americans the undesirability of including the Philippines because of the adverse effect it would have on the United Kingdom prestige, more particularly in ... Borneo, Malaya, Hong Kong and so forth. The Australians are ropeable about the British. They say they have been doing everything they can before Dulles arrived and since he arrived to stop the Treaty...\textsuperscript{4}

So nervous were the Australians about possible British interference that Alan Watt, the Secretary for External Affairs, visited Wellington from 18 to 20 March 1951 to confer with McIntosh. Together they went over the issue of the Philippines.

McIntosh summed up the case against Philippine inclusion. They had a corrupt, unstable government; they might embarrass Australia and New Zealand; might cause the diversion of forces from the Middle East; their inclusion might lead to pressure from the US to include Japan as well. The real objective was an American guarantee against Asian expansionism from any quarter. The Tasman neighbours wanted to avoid close military and political association with Asian countries. Watt agreed. Australia wanted the US guarantee for three reasons: against a re-armed Japan, against Communist imperialism, and against Asian expansionism. Surprisingly he took the third (probably a reference to Indonesian ambitions in New Guinea) as the strongest, but this could not be said publicly. He thought the US would insist on including the Philippines and this would have to be accepted. As for the British, Watt felt that opinion in New Zealand, and to a lesser extent in Australia, would favour Britain's inclusion if it were at all possible, but he could not see a basis for it.\textsuperscript{5} When the matter of Britain's attitude was discussed at the New Zealand Cabinet, on 22 March 1951, even ex-empire loyalist Doidge spoke for the 'supreme importance' of the US guarantee and said 'Britannia no longer ruled the waves'.\textsuperscript{6}