The attempts to substantiate a deduction strategy beginning either from the form of judgment or from the transcendental unity of apperception have proven unsuccessful and this has led to a substantiation of our view that it is in fact requisite to articulate a conception of the deduction beginning from a discussion of a priori synthesis. Thus far, the argument to this effect has proceeded by a process of elimination of alternatives but now it is necessary to show that we can illuminate the nature of the Transcendental Deduction in our preferred manner. This will require articulating principally the notion of the transcendental synthesis of imagination. As with our previous chapters we will not proceed here by first setting out a general hermeneutic strategy with regard to the texts of the deduction but rather from a process of reconstruction that will respond to readings of it that have brought to our attention what we take to be particularly pertinent considerations. However, we can state a number of points at the initiation of this reading that will set out parameters that will be important for us in assessing both Kant’s own discussions and reconstructions of them. These include the need to articulate the nature and point of the symmetry thesis hence connecting the complex notion of synthesis that will be required for a viable reconstruction of the deduction argument to the complex notions already articulated as those of judgment and transcendental subjectivity. The nature of this investigation will be connected then to a description of how the unity of intuition can be brought before cognition and a description of how the nature of perception itself can be articulated in a complex enough manner for a justification of the conception of material objects to emerge from it. An even more important criterion, and one unmentioned by us up to this point, is that the argument of the deduction be shown to have clear connection to that of the transcendental
schematism. This certainly could not be done by a reconstruction centred on either judgment or the transcendental unity of apperception. Hence it will be the burden of our argument that not only is the reconstruction of a viable deduction strategy one that has to rely upon transcendental psychology but, furthermore, it is only such a strategy that can connect the deduction argument to the considerations of transcendental schematism. In conclusion, since the discussion of transcendental synthesis will naturally articulate intuition in relation to its \textit{a priori} conditions, not least those of time, it will also be necessary to show the connection between the unity of intuition and the articulation of \textit{a priori} identity that we have seen needs to be comprehensive enough in conception to extend to a thought of objects in general, even to their purest formality. Another way of putting this point is that we need to connect the unity of conceptual possibility, a unity that is part of a coherent conception of the notion of transcendental subjectivity, to that of the unity of intuition as provided for us in experience in empirical intuitions.

In order to execute this programme of research, however, it will first be necessary to look at some considerations that suggest that if the argument of the transcendental deduction does turn on considerations from transcendental psychology, particularly considerations that require an account of \textit{a priori} synthesis, that this effectively counts against the very programme of the deduction. Two types of such argument exist at present, albeit, pointing in quite different directions. On the one hand, there are analytical arguments that view any presentation of transcendental psychology, particularly one that relies on the notion of \textit{a priori} synthesis, as tantamount to an admission that the project of the Transcendental Deduction cannot be carried out. These arguments are presented in their firmest and most influential form in the works of Paul Guyer. By contrast, I will be arguing that the apparent opposition to the notion of transcendental psychology on the part of Strawson is not characteristic of his full position. On the other hand, the phenomenological reading of the Transcendental Deduction carried out by Martin Heidegger argues for a reinterpretation of the discussion of transcendental synthesis in a manner that effectively removes the suggestion of transcendental psychology. This reading will be considered subsequent to some of the basic characterizations of why a need for transcendental psychology can be seen to emerge from discussions of different aspects of Strawson’s and Sellars’ accounts of Kant than we have discussed thus far.