Just as we saw in the preceding period, counter-hooliganism policing policies continued to be influenced during this period by the prevailing crime control model and the state of police cooperation in Europe. As a consequence, they were affected by both the spread of the risk-based social control model and the expansion of the policing of football hooliganism at the European level. In the former case, policies for countering the phenomenon, which were influenced by the risk management principle, increasingly involved the enforcement of proactive measures against football supporters which, in practice, entailed the introduction and/or more widespread use of many surveillance and control devices which were detrimental to civil liberties. In the case of the internationalization of policing, the homogenization of domestic policing policies under way during this period, which was influenced by the accelerated pace of Europeanization and the ensuing gradual convergence of justice and internal security policies at the national level, was particularly evident in the implementation of crowd control strategies at the national level and in the ongoing strengthening of cooperation at both the national and international levels. In addition to these two main influences, there was a third which grew out of the general changes that had occurred within the security realm, namely, the gradual privatization of crowd control within the stadia.

The policing of football hooliganism developed from the emerging regulatory framework which we examined earlier swiftly shed its earlier country-specific variations because, being still reliant on crowd control policies, it was influenced by the standardization process affecting these at the European level. Schematically speaking, it revolved around their three main axes (Della Porta 1995; Della Porta and Reiter 1998; Fillieule and Della Porta 2006), namely, restricting the use of violence as far
as possible, tolerating minor offences in order to prevent the outbreak or escalation of football-related incidents, and prioritizing intelligence-gathering. The changes that had taken place in the policing of crowds thus signalled the future shape of preventive counter-hooliganism policies, the strengthening of which had been sought by the authors of the 1985 European Convention, as well as many other subsequent regulatory texts adopted by both European Community bodies and UEFA.

### 1 Policing and the perception of threat

The first two axes, which confirmed the validity of the policies followed in Northern European countries and led to the exclusively repressive policies used in Southern European countries being gradually replaced by preventive strategies, prompted public security agents to plan and moderate their actions. Mirroring the actions of football hooligans whose activities, in response to the tightening of controls inside stadia, had undergone a temporal and spatial displacement, police strategies from then on made a similar shift in time and space to encompass both the pre- and post-match periods as well as any other places outside of stadia where incidents might occur. However, though they seemed viable, these policies soon showed their limitations. The fact that they had not been designed autonomously meant that they were linked so inextricably to the actions of the football hooligans that they led to a real ‘battle of wits’ (Williams et al. 1986: 584) which dragged all the actors involved into a descending spiral of violence with no way out. Since this type of approach, by definition, ruled out de-escalation, the way in which football hooliganism manifested itself from then on reflected the fact that each side was increasingly engaged in planning action strategies that would continue to reinforce each other *ad infinitum*. In other words, with no referents other than the forms in which the conflict manifested itself, policing of the phenomenon lost any innovative impulse it may have had and consisted only of the outcome, however temporary, of the interaction between certain initiatives taken by each of the parties in conflict. Its intention was no longer to resolve but to eliminate or, at the very least, contain conflict by attacking only its obvious symptoms. Thus, far from yielding the expected results, it led to increasingly serious football-related incidents insofar as it contributed towards their spatial–temporal displacement and helped to radicalize the activities of football hooligans who, precisely because they were seeking to avoid police controls inside stadia, began to take action in