The supposed clarity of we moderns rests only on the fact that we have done away with the problems [G21 168].

The preceding chapter of this study showed that despite Heidegger's charge in 1927 concerning the naivety of Greek ontology, the analytic of \textit{Dasein} is nourished by an appropriation of Aristotle's account of movement. The question of movement, however, is but one aspect of Heidegger's positive appropriation of Aristotle in the \textit{dismantling return} of the early 1920s. The texts from this period show that the elaboration of the analytic of \textit{Dasein} draws, in addition, from the richness of the anthropology inherent in Aristotle's practical writings. In particular, the essay of 1922, \textit{Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle}, shows that Aristotle's account of \textit{phronesis} or prudence is of fundamental importance for the analysis of \textit{Dasein}'s authenticity, its authentic appropriation of itself as a being-possible. This would mean, then, that in the course of the 1920s Heidegger would have developed one aspect of Aristotle's determination of human being as a remedy to the ontological naivety and inauthenticity concerning human being from which it itself would suffer. If not exactly a 'paradox',\textsuperscript{1} this is certainly remarkable.

The leading aim of this chapter is to examine the account of prudence in the sixth book of the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, and to interrogate the meaning and possibility of Heidegger's appropriation of it. It can be said that the question of prudence becomes a focal point of Heidegger's interpretation in the early 1920s because it implies the questions of temporality and movement specifically in relation to Aristotle's account of human being. Yet the account of prudence involves another of the themes of the destruction of the traditional content of ancient ontology

\textsuperscript{1} M. Sinclair, \textit{Heidegger, Aristotle and the Work of Art}
© Mark Sinclair 2006
that Heidegger sketches in §6 of *Being and Time*. As I indicated in the introduction to this study, the meanings of being that the destruction is to examine are not only being as being-produced and being as constant presence, but also being as truth. This third aspect of the problematic has, in fact, a quite particular status, insofar as the destruction of the traditional content of Aristotle’s determination of being and truth is discussed, if not presented fully, within the body of the text of *Being and Time* itself, particularly in §§33 and 44.

The account of prudence in the *Nicomachean Ethics* involves an idea of truth since Aristotle describes it as a mode of ἀληθείας, of revealing or being-in-the-truth. Before turning directly to Heidegger’s interpretation of prudence in the second section of the present chapter, therefore, it is necessary to examine the destruction of the traditional content of Aristotle’s determination of truth that Heidegger seeks to effect. Within the lecture course of 1925–6 entitled *Logic: The Question of Truth*, Heidegger announces his intentions in enumerating three claims that phenomenology as fundamental ontology aims to overturn [G21 128]: first, that the site of truth is the judgement or proposition; second, that truth is a correspondence of thought with thing and third, that the historical origin of both claims is to be found in the work of Aristotle. I begin with the first two claims before turning directly to the work of Aristotle.

### 4.1 Destroying the traditional content of Aristotle’s account of truth

#### α. The assertion and the primordial phenomenon of truth

The originally scholastic definition of truth as *adequatio intellectus et rei*, an adequation or correspondence of the thing with thought, is famously ‘assumed as granted’ by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Truth, on this account, is the correspondence of the subjective representations or concepts bound together in a judgement, a judgement expressed by the linguistic proposition, with the state of affairs judged. Thus, as Kant writes: ‘Truth and illusion are not in the object so far as it is intuited, but in the judgement about it so far as it is thought.’ The site of truth is the judgement, and it is true insofar as it agrees with or corresponds to the things judged; the false judgement, for its part, is one that does not correspond to the things.

As seemingly self-evident and traditional as it may be, Heidegger argues that such a conception of truth as an agreement or correspondence of knowledge with its object is profoundly problematic [SZ 216]: how can