This chapter will not set out from a seminal author or book, but rather from a seminal theory and praxis, namely psychoanalysis. But, claiming this central place for psychoanalysis, are we also not immediately prompted to confront the allegation that, concerning the issue of psychologization, it was precisely psychoanalysis which opened Pandora's box? Just consider the traditional critiques of psychoanalysis: theoretically it would offer a pseudo-scientific, speculative image of the human being, and as praxis it would be an anti-empirical, pseudo-hermeneutic method leading to nothing but conflicting interpretations. In this way psychoanalysis is reproached for merely creating meanings. Instead of revealing insights, it thus litters and contaminates the scientific and cultural fields (Cioffi, 1998; Macmillan, 1997).

However, one could ask, what would it precisely contaminate and what should be salvaged from it? For, are these critics not presupposing a virgin-like true human psyche and an original unbesmirched Lebenswelt, that would have preceded the infamous psychoanalytic colonization? This chapter, however, aims to show not only that there is a nostalgic romanticism potentially underlying this critique, but also that those who consider psychoanalysis as responsible for dragging a good part of the field of the human sciences and the psycho-social praxis into the quicksand of pseudo-scientific speculation, often turn out to be the grave-diggers of the psyche as such. By putting forward neurology, evidence-based medicine, sociology, linguistics, and cognitive science as the foundations of psychology, rapidly the psyche and the psychical disappear and lose any meaning. Which of course, in a curious way realizes what I have called in this book the zero level of psychology. However, it realizes this zero level of subjectivity precisely as not dealt with and not thought through to the end.
In this chapter I will oppose the two *fictions* which underlay this psycho-biopolitical stance (a pre-psychological life-world and a pre-psychological or a-psychological subjectivity) to the call of the philosopher Marc De Kesel for psychoanalysis to engage in a debate with the human sciences. De Kesel makes this call – most timely one could say as it is done precisely at the deathbed of psychoanalysis – as he believes that psychoanalysis has an important point to bring into the discussions in the contemporary cultural and scientific fields. That point is, according to De Kesel, the psychoanalytic principle of *fiction as fiction* as a constitutive dimension of personal and social reality. Working from this insight, I shall explore the possibility of a debate between psychoanalysis and the human sciences and, in particular, between psychoanalysis and today’s hegemonic forms of psychology. For at first sight a debate seems utterly impossible as the mainstream psy-sciences are far from acknowledging something as *fiction as fiction*. Rather, I will claim, they remain caught in fiction as such, a peculiar fiction, that is, the attempt to unmask things as they really are (e.g. the hard neurobiological reality). However, drawing on examples of phenomena of psychologization (in reality TV and in contemporary discourses of parent and child education) the different responses of psychoanalysis and psychology to modernity and modern subjectivity will turn out to be eventually and necessarily intertwined. Psychoanalysis and psychology can indeed be seen from one and the same genealogical perspective, in that they both have to be looked upon from the gaze of psychologization. Considering the arguments made in the preceding chapters, the conclusion that the proposed debate is a political one will almost immediately force itself upon us. Let me therefore start this chapter with a preliminary survey of the political stakes of the debate.

**The political stakes of the debate**

**From politics to psychology . . .**

Discussing literature and psychoanalysis, the philosopher De Kesel (2005a) pleads for a presence for psychoanalysis in the cultural and scientific fields. He argues that it is high time we debated the grounding principles of the human sciences and considered what exactly these are. He goes on to say that we are not far from the point where what we might understand as reality will be replaced by image-culture, leaving no space whatsoever for approaches which value the discursive dimension of human reality. De Kesel contends that we should strive to understand reality beyond the field of images and, at the risk of sounding strange, he